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CHAPTER 16 
Labor Law 
DAVID F. GRUNEBAUM* 
JAMES M. LITION* 
JOAN G. DOLAN* 
§ 16.1. Commission Post Election Representation Case 
Procedures. During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial Court and 
the Appeals Court each issued significant decisions involving Labor 
Relations Commission (Commission) representation case post election 
procedures. 
In Labor Relations Commission v. Clover Leaf Corporation• the Su-
preme Judicial Court reversed a three-judge panel of the superior court 
invoked under the Appellate Procedures governing chapter 150A of the 
General Laws and affirmed the action of the Commission. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that an employer could not challenge the validity 
of the Commission's certification of the exclusive bargaining agent by 
refusing to bargain and precipitating an unfair labor practice where the 
issue could have been, but was not, raised as an objection to the conduct 
of the election.z Where an employee organization receives less than a 
majority of votes of the eligible voters, albeit more than a majority of 
the valid votes cast, the employer must file a timely objection to the 
conduct of the election in order to challenge the certification. 
On September 17, 1970, the Chicopee, Holyoke, Westfield Bartenders, 
Hotel, Motel, Cafeteria and Restaurant Employees International Union 
Local116, AFL-CIO (Union) filed a petition for representation with the 
* DAVID F. GRUNEBAUM is Counsel for the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission 
and author of§ 16.1-16.2. 
* JAMES M. LITTON is Counsel for the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission 
and author of § 16.3. 
* JoAN G. DoLAN is a CommiBBioner for the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission 
and author of § 16.4-16.5. 
This article was written by the authors in their private capacity. No official support or 
endorsement by the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission is intended or should be 
inferred. 
§16.1. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 373, 360 N.E.2d 627. 
2 /d. at 377-78, 360 N.E.2d at 630. 
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Commission, pursuant to section 5(c) of chapter 150A of the General 
Laws. 3 The Commission, following an investigation, found that a ques-
tion concerning representation existed and ordered that an election be 
conducted. 4 In this election seven votes were cast: five for the Union, 
zero for no union, one protested and one blank or void. 5 At the time of 
the election there were 21 eligible voters in the unit.• No objections to 
the conduct of the election were filed within the 5-day period set forth 
in the rules and regulations of the Commission. 7 Consequently, on 
March 30, 1971 the Commission certified the Union as the collective 
bargaining representative for the employees in the unit.8 
On April 2, 1971 and again on April 14, 1971 the Union requested 
bargaining.• The employer failed to respond to these requests and 
shortly thereafter the Union filed a charge of unfair labor practice with 
the Commission alleging that the employer was refusing to bargain. 10 
The Commission investigated the charge and on November 21, 1972 
issued its own complaint of unfair labor practice, and ordered a hear-
ing.11 Following this hearing, on January 18, 1973, the Commission is-
sued a decision finding that Clover Leaf had refused to bargain and 
ordered it to bargain on demand.12 
Clover Leaf appealed the Commission decision to the superior court13 
3 Id. at 374, 36<fN.E.2d at 628. 
• Id. at 374, 360 N.E.2d at 628-29. 
• ld. at 374 n.2, 360 N.E.2d at 629 n.2. 
'Id. 
7 Rules and Regulations relating to the administration of the Labor Relations Law; 
Chapter 150A, Art. II, § 9: 
Where the Commission determines that an election by secret ballot shall be held, 
it shall direct that such election be conducted upon such terms and such matter as 
it may specify. Within five days after the tabulation of the ballots any party to the 
proceeding may file with the Commission any objection relative to the election, 
provided, however, that the objecting party has not waived its right to object. If it 
appears to the Commission that any such objection raises a substantial material 
issue with respect to the conduct of the election, it shall issue and cause to be served 
upon the party a notice of hearing on said objection before the Commission or 
member thereof. The Commission shall, after the close of such hearing, proceed as 
set forth in section 8 of this Article. If no objection raising a substantial and mate-
rial issue with respect to the conduct of the election is filed, the Commission shall 
proceed to certify to the parties to the proceeding the name or names of the repre-
sentatives that have been designated or selected, or to make such other disposition 
of the matter. 
8 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 374, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
• Id. at 374-75, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
"Id. 
11 Id. at 375, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
IZ Jd. 
13 Clover Leaf appealed the Commission decision pursuant to G.L. c. 150A, § 6(0 which 
provides in part: 
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and the Commission cross-petitioned for enforcement. 14 The superior 
court, three-judge panel, reversed the Commission. The superior court 
held that whereas less than a majority of the employees eligible to vote 
might select the bargaining representative, if a majority of the votes cast 
were for the Union, the Commission had an obligation to determine 
"whether the election was actually representative."" Since no such find-
ing was made by the Commission the court remanded this question to 
the Commission for determination. 
Rather than accept the remand, the Commission appealed the matter 
to the Appeals Court." On its own motion the Supreme Judicial Court 
removed the matter .17 Since the Commission had refused the remand 
the Court initially dealt with the issue of ripeness. 18 
The Court held the case ripe for judicial review relying on two prior 
Supreme Judicial Court cases reviewing Labor-Relations Commission 
decisions, where the issue before the Court had involved interpretation 
of law rather than fact." In so doing the Court in effect accepted the 
Commission's characterization of the issues on review. The Commission 
characterized the issue as being whether an employer could challenge 
the conduct of an election by refusing to bargain or whether it was 
required to file objections to the conduct of the election in order to raise 
such issues.28 The effect of the Court's accepting this characterization 
was to preclude the necessity of taking evidence on the underlying repre-
sentative character of the election. The Commission had accepted the 
premise set forth in the superior court decision that it had an obligation 
to determine the representative character of the election results prior to 
issuing a certificate of result. The Commission argued, however, that the 
burden of going forward on this question of fact lay with the challenging 
party and must be raised by the filing of objections. The Commission 
then argued, that where the notice posting and actual conduct of the 
election revealed no deficiencies there was a presumption of validity, 
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission granting or denying in 
whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the superior 
court for the county wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to 
have been engaged in, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, by filing 
in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modi-
fied or set aside. 
14 The Commission cross-petitioned for enforcement pursuant to G.L. c. 150A, § 6(e). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 375-76, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
•• ld. at 373, 360 N.E.2d at 628. 
17 !d. 
1A Id. at 376, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
•• Gallagher v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n., 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 32, 359 N.E.2d 36; 
Massachusetts Probation Ass'n y. Commissioner of Administration, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1814, 352 N.E.2d 684. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 375-76, 360 N.E.2d at 629. 
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justifying the issuance of a certificate.21 Since no objections had been 
filed the certificate was valid and could not later be challenged in an 
unfair labor practice proceeding. Thus the sole issue on review, the 
Commission argued, should be the issue of whether the employer had 
in fact refused to bargain. On this issue there was no dispute. With this 
characterization the Court agreed and held 
[U]nless extraordinary circumstances appear which under statute 
excuse the failure to file timely objections relative to the certifica-
tion of the results of an election a party may not subsequently raise 
such objection in a collateral proceeding.22 
Since the Court found no reason to excuse Clover Leaf it concluded that 
Clover Leaf was foreclosed from raising the issue in an unfair labor 
posture after failing to object to the conduct of an election within five 
days.23 
It must be noted that neither of these arguments was raised before the 
Commission where the issue had been whether it was necessary to ob-
tain a majority of votes of all eligible voters. 24 On this issue both the 
superior court and the Commission had rejected the employer's conten-
tions.25 
" The election was adequately publicized by the posting of official notices in 
conspicuous places on company premises to inform eligible voters of the balloting 
details (i.e., purpose of election, location of polls, time of voting, eligibility rules) 
prior to the date of the election. Further, it is patently clear that the Commission 
cannot force people to vote. Where, as here, the record before the lower court 
indicated that the representation election conducted by the Commission was fair 
and regular in every respect, and in the absence of any timely objection to the 
election by either party, it would be inappropriate to take evidence on the subjec-
tive motivation of the nonparticipating eligible voters. . . . As long as no objections 
were filed with respect to material issues of fairness, proper advertisement, fraud, 
coercion or intimidation, every election must be deemed "actually representative 
and will be so certified." 
Commission Brief at 36-38. 
22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 377-78, 360 N.E.2d at 630. See also Clover Leaf Corporation 
d/b/a The Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, Commission Slip Opinion, UP~2166 (1973) at 
56. 
23 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 379, 360 N.E.2d at 630. 
" The issues before the Supreme Judicial Court were: (1) Whether an employer could 
challenge the conduct of an election by refusing to bargain, without previously filing 
objections to the conduct of the election; (2) whether there is a presumption that the tally 
is sufficient to find majority status where notice and posting have been proper; (3) in light 
of this presumption does the burden of proof shift to the employer. 
25 Decision of Superior Court, Suffolk County Equity Nos. 1667, 1838 issued January 
30, 1974; J. J. Griffin, Moriarty and Smith. 
Although a literal reading of the language of the statute (G.L.c. 150A, Section 5 
(a)) would seem to require a vote by a majority of all of the members of a bargaining 
unit in order to elect a bargaining representative, we are persuaded that the deci-
sions have stood unchallenged for approximately twenty years. Although Section 
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There is no doubt that Clover Leaf failed to follow the prescribed 
route for challenging the issuance of a certification of the results of an 
election. However, it is equally clear that had Clover Leaf followed the 
prescribed route and subsequently wished to appeal a Commission deci-
sion it would then have had to refuse to bargain. One can argue that by 
simply refusing to bargain Clover Leaf precluded the possibility that the 
Commission might have found in its favor, but this does not respond to 
the fact that the Commission could have, and to some extent did, ad-
dress this issue in the unfair labor practice decision.26 While the Com-
mission argued before the Supreme Judicial Court what is in essence a 
theory offailure to exhaust administrative remedies, the decision by the 
Commission makes no mention of this defect. Rather, the Commission 
in its decision focused upon the representative character of the elec-
tion.27 The Commission cited several National Labor Relations Board 
cases in which less than a majority of the eligible voters voted but a 
majority of those voting voted for one union. 28 In each of these cases the 
Board had certified the union which received the greatest number of 
votes. The Commission did not explicitly find that the Clover Leaf 
election results were representative but the decision clearly implies this 
finding." However once before the Court, the Commission altered its 
5(a) was enacted before any of the above cited decisions were handed down, that 
subsection was amended in 1951, and the legislature made no attempt to alter the 
language in question or to clarify the point. 
In our view, the proper rule is that laid down by the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in the Central Dispensary and Emergency Hospital Case 
and by the Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit in the Standard Line and Stone 
Case. A bargaining agent may be selected or designated by a majority of those 
employees who vote in an election, even though the number of employees voting in 
the election is less than a majority of those entitled to vote; provided however that 
the election was "actually representative." The question as to whether an election 
was "actually representative" is a question of fact which must be determined by 
the Commission in the first instance; and that determination must be made on the 
basis of substantial evidence. 
21 Clover Leaf Corporation d/b/a The Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, Commission Slip 
Opinion, UP-2166 (1973), at 4. 
n ld. 
21 North Electric Co. and lnt'l Union, Allied Ind. vs. Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 
165 N.L.R.B. 942,65 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1967); Stiefel Constr. Corp. and United Steelworkers 
of America, CIO, 65 N.L.R.B. 925, 17 L.R.R.M. 251 (1946); East Ohio Gas Co. and Natural 
Gas Workers Union, Local 555, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 140 N.L.R.B. 1269, 52 L.R.R.M. 1220, 
1222 (1963). 
21 The Commission issued the following order: Upon the basis of the foregoing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that the Employer shall: 
I. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, as the 
exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees of Clover Leaf Corporation 
d/b/a/ The Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. 
II. Take the following action which the Commission finds will effectuate the policies 
of the State Labor Relations Law: 
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posture and pressed an exhaustion of administrative remedies argu-
ment. The Supreme Judicial Court for its part does not address the issue 
of whether the Commission waived the procedural defect by addressing 
the merits of the case. Although the Court initially set out to review the 
Commission decision, it ultimately adopted the Commission's theory341 
which was argued on appeal and never mentioned the underlying Com-
mission decision. 
The Court in accepting the Commission's argument took note of the 
delaying effect of permitting a party to litigate these issues in the con-
text of unfair labor practice as opposed to an objection to the conduct 
of an election.31 The Court found that the delay would be contrary to 
the essential purposes of chapter 150A; "prompt and certain certifica-
tion of the election results and orderly commencement of collective bar-
gaining."32 What is perhaps not apparent in the Court decision is that 
this distinction between filing objections or refusing to bargain was only 
responsible for six weeks out of a total of six years delay in the matter 
sub judice. 33 Moreover, if prompt resolution is to be considered of para-
mount importance then one may legitimately inquire as to the need for 
requiring that unit determinations be appealed by refusing to bargain 
and subsequently precipitating a pro forma unfair labor practice.34 
(1) Immediately, upon request, bargain in good faith with the Union; 
(2) Post immediately in a conspicuous place where the above-mentioned employ-
ees customarily assemble, and leave posted for a period of thirty consecutive days 
from the date of posting, a copy of this order in its entirety, together with a state-
ment attached thereto that: 
1. The Employer will not engage in the conduct from which it is ordered 
to cease and desist in Paragraph I of this Order; 
2. The Employer, upon request, shall bargain in good faith with the 
Union. 
III. Notify the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission at its office in the Lever-
ett Saltonstall State Office Building, 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachu-
setts, 02202, within twenty days of the receipt of this Decision and Order of the 
steps the Employer has taken to comply with this Order. 
30 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 377, 360 N.E.2d at 630. 
31 Id. at 378, 360 N.E.2d at 630 (citing Article II § 9, supra note 7). 
32 ld. 
33 The Court stated: 
It is difficult to imagine a case less conducive to the effectuation of the policies 
and purposes of the labor relations statutes than the one now before us, in which 
collective bargaining has been delayed for six years after the election and certifica-
tion of the bargaining representative. 
Id. at 378, 360 N.E.2d at 630. The Cloverleaf election was held on March 4, 1971, the 
charge of refusal to bargain was filed on April 23, 1971, a complaint was issued by the 
Commission against Cloverleaf on November 21, 1972 and a formal hearing on the com-
plaint was held on December 19, 1972. 
" See Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597, 45 N.E.2d 925 
(1942). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/19
340 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §16.1 
The method of processing objections to the conduct of an election, and 
the rules and regulations of the Commission, make it clear that objec-
tions are part of the representation case. Article 2, section 9 of the Rules 
and Regulations relating to the Administration of the Labor Relations 
Law provides a rule for the filing of objections within the same section 
which regulates the actual direction of an election. Section 9 provides 
that 
If it appears to the Commission that any such objection raises a 
substantial material issue with respect to the conduct of the elec-
tion, it shall issue and cause to be served upon the parties a notice 
of hearing on such objection before the Commission or a member 
thereof. The Commission shall after the close of such hearing, 
proceed as set forth in Section 8 of this article. If no objection 
raising a substantial material issue with respect to the conduct of 
the election is filed, the Commission shall proceed to ceitify to the 
parties to the proceeding the name or names of the representatives 
that have been designated or selected, or to make other disposition 
of the matter. 
Article 8 clearly refers to this as all being part of the "investigation. "35 
Since the non-reviewability of representation cases rests, in part, upon 
the predicate that such hearings are investigatory and non-adjudicatory 
in nature, it would seem that a determination of the objections would 
not be reviewable. 38 In keeping with the usual practice it would seem 
then, that a refusal to bargain would be necessary in order to obtain a 
review. 37 If such is the case there would seem to be little basis for assum-
ing that objections will be more expeditiously resolved than unfair labor 
practice proceedings. 
Clover Leaf presents an added consideration. Many objections to the 
conduct of an election are similar to and result in the filing of unfair 
labor practices. Thus threats or promises by an employer or a union 
made in anticipation of an election are both unfair labor practices and 
valid objections to the conduct of the election.38 Often objections in 
unfair labor practice charges are consolidated for trial purposes, al-
though the burden of proof and standard applied by the Commission 
'" Article Vlll, Administration of Labor Relations. 
11 Sullivan v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 904, 364 N.E.2d 
1099. 
17 See Sullivan v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 904, 364 
N.E.2d 1099, where the Appeals Court denied review of objections to the conduct of the 
election filed by the losing union and reaffirmed its commitment to the principles enunci-
ated in Jordan Marsh v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597, 45 N.E.2d 925 (1942). 
11 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 221 U.S. 678 (1944); Dal-tex Optical Co., 137 
N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962); Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277, 
56 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1964). 
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may be different.3' However, the Clover Leaf unfair labor practice is not 
a pre-election conduct unfair labor practice. Rather, it is an objection 
that goes to the nature of the election as opposed to the parties' conduct. 
Thus it is much more akin to a refusal to bargain which challenges the 
unit determination.40 In essence it challenges the Commission's conduct, 
not Union conduct. This case then, raises anew, the continued appropri-
ateness of applying the Jordan Marsh 41 standard of non-reviewability of 
representation cases. 
A second case, one decided by the Appeals Court, also involved post-
election certification procedures. In Sullivan v. Labor Relations 
Commission42 the losing union, Massachusetts State Employees Asso-
ciation (MSEA), in the state employee elections in Units 1, 2, 6 and 8 
sought to preclude the Labor Relations Commission from certifying an 
employee organization known as the "Alliance" consisting of various 
locals of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Em-
ployees and Service Employees International Union, as the exclusive 
bargaining representative, for failing to comply with sections 13 and 14 
of chapter 150E.43 Sections 13 and 14 require an initial filing by a union 
3
' Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board§ 102.33(a)(2); Freeport 
Marble and Tile Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 810, 59 L.R.R.M. 1561 (1965), en{. in part 367 F.2d 
371 (1st Cir. 1966). 
•• Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597, 45 N.E.2d 925 (1942). 
" ld. 
" Sullivan v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 1977 Mass. App. Ct:Adv. Sh. 904, 364 N.E.2d 
1099. 
43 G.L. c. 150E, § 13 provides: 
The commission shall maintain a list of employee organizations. To be recognized 
as such and to be included in the list an organization shall file with the commission 
a statement of its name, the name and address of its secretary or other officer to 
whom notices may be sent, the date of its organization, and its affiliations, if any, 
with other organizations. Every employee organization shall notify the commission 
promptly of any change of name or of the name and address of its secretary or other 
officer to whom notices may be sent, or of its affilliations. 
The commission shall indicate on the list which employee organizations are ex-
clusive representatives of appropriate bargaining units, the effective dates of their 
certification, and the effective date and expiration date of any agreement reached 
between the public employer and the exclusive representative. Copies of such Jist 
shall be made available to interested parties upon request. 
In the event of failure of compliance with this section, the commission shall 
compel such compliance by appropriate order, said order to be enforceable in the 
same manner as other orders of the commission under this chapter. 
Section 14 provides: 
No person or association of persons shall operate or maintain an employee organi-
zation under this chapter unless and until there has been filed with the commission 
a written statement signed by the president and secretary of such employee organi-
zation setting forth the names and addresses of all the officers of such organization, 
the aims and objectives of such organization, the scale of dues, initiation fees, fines 
8
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and a subsequent annual statement updating the initial filing. These 
filings contain information about union officers, by-laws, and finances. 
Prior to the election the constituent unions of the Alliance, SEIU and 
AFSCME locals, each filed the requisite forms for themselves with the 
Commission. However, no independent forms were filed on behalf of the 
Alliance. The Alliance was, as its name implies, an alliance of these two 
unions for the purposes of seeking exclusive collective bargaining repre-
sentation rights for various state employee bargaining units. 
After losing the election MSEA filed a motion with the Commission 
requesting that the certification not issue and that the election be set 
aside, alleging that the Alliance was not an employee organization. 44 The 
Commission denied the motion. However, it advised the parties that it 
would not issue the certification until the Alliance had complied with 
sections 13 and 14.45 MSEA appealed to the superior court pursuant to 
General Laws chapter 30A, section 14.41 The superior court dismissed 
the MSEA petition on the Commission's motion. MSEA then appealed 
to the Appeals Court. As a preliminary matter the Appeals Court held 
that this was an issue involving certification and therefore not a final 
adjudicatory decision within the meaning of 30A section 14.47 In this the 
court followed Jordan Marsh. In Jordan Marsh the Court had initially 
determined that unit determination and representation case issues 
would not be reviewable. The Court had held there, that review of unit 
determination cases could only be obtained by a refusal to bargain and 
consequent finding of unfair labor practice.48 
and assessments to be charged to the members, and the annual salaries to be paid 
to the officers. 
Every employee organization shall keep an adequate record of its financial trans-
actions and shall make annually available to its members and to nonmember em-
ployees who are required to pay a service fee under section twelve of this act, within 
sixty days after the end of its fiscal year, a detailed written financial report in the 
form of a balance sheet and operating statement. Such report shall indicate the 
total of receipts of any kind and the sources of such receipts, and disbursements 
made by it during its last fiscal year. A copy of such report shall be filed with the 
commission. 
In the event of failure of compliance with this section, the commission shall 
compel such compliance by appropriate order, said order to be enforceable in the 
same manner as other orders of the commission under this chapter. 
" 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 904,905,364 N.E.2d 1099, 1100, noting that the several 
local unions which comprise the Alliance had complied with the reporting requirements 
of sections 13 and 14. ld. at n.3. 
•• ld. at 905-06, 364 N.E.2d at 1100. 
" G.L. c. 30A, § 14 provides that: "Any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a 
final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . shall be entitled to a 
judicial review. . . . " 
" 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 907, 364 N.E.2d at 1100-01. 
48 Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 312 Mass. 597, 602, 45 N.E.2d 925, 
927-28 (1947). . 
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The decision in Sullivan raises problems since it effectively foreclosed 
the only party who was aggrieved from obtaining review. The MSEA 
was precluded from obtaining review because prior case law had deter-
mined that the case must be framed as a refusal to bargain. The prevail-
ing union, the Alliance, was not likely to challenge its own certification 
and the employer had little interest in having the matter reviewed. 
Despite what might appear as a foreclosure of review the Appeals Court 
stated that the actual Commission determination had been proper.48 
The court held that section 13 and 14 do not require denial of certifica-
tion, but that the Commission may use its broad statutory authority to 
condition the grant of certification upon the filing of these forms by the 
employee organization.00 
The Clover Leaf and Sullivan cases would seem to leave the practi-
tioner in somewhat of a quandary since Sullivan precludes direct review 
of certification issues e~en when the denial effectively precludes any 
review at all, whereas Clover Leaf holds that, initially, all internal pro-
cedures respecting a certification case must be exhausted. If Clover Leaf 
is read as permitting review of a decision on an objection to the conduct 
of an election then it is inconsistent with Sullivan. It may, however, be 
argued that Clover Leaf only requires that issues be raised in a timely 
fashion, a legal concept of general applicability. If this latter reading is 
correct then it would appear that the employer, Clover Leaf, could have 
obtained review of the certification by first objecting to the conduct of 
the election and then refusing to bargain, thus precipitating a finding 
of unfair labor practice. This would be consistent with the prevailing 
practice in unit determinations but would hardly expedite case han-
dling. 
The authority of the Labor Relations Commission in representation 
cases, more particularly the authority of the Commission to establish 
statewide units under G.L. c. 150E, was further affirmed in another case 
decided by the Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year. Unfor-
tunately, in the process the Supreme Judicial Court may have under-
mined or at least further confused the Jordan Marsh non-appealability 
of representation cases doctrine. 
In Gallagher v. Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), 51 the Court 
affirmed a superior court allowance of the defendant's motion to dismiss 
and held tha~ MDC employees were not employees of a "district" within 
the meaning of section 1 of chapter 150E of the General Laws. 62 
Prior to the passage of chapter 150E13 the employees of the MDC had, 
41 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 907-08, 364 N.E.2d at 1101. 
• Id. at 909, 364 N.E.2d at 1101. 
•• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 32, 359 N.E.2d 36. 
12 Id. at 37-38, 359 N.E.2d at 39. 
111 G.L. c. 150E, effective July l, 1974 (superceding G.L. c. 149, § 178F) established a 
10
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through their certified bargaining representative, Local 1242, bargained 
directly with the MDC. Pursuant to chapter 149 of the General Laws, 
section 178(f) through (n) inclusive, the MDC and Local 1242 had en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement. 54 Following the passage of 
chapter 150E the Labor Relations Commission decided to establish the 
bargaining unit structure for state employees by rule-making.55 The 
Commission adopted a 10-unit structure of statewide units by occupa-
tional groups.55 Its structure also issued a rule which provided that ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances it would not entertain petitions for 
representations which did not seek to represent employees in units 
which substantially complied with those set forth in the rules.57 Subse-
quent to the promulgation of these rules the Alliance, AFSCME/SEIU 
filed a petition seeking representation in Units 2 and 3. Each of these 
units included employees of the MDC who had been in the unit repre-
uniform collective bargaining scheme for all public employees and expanded the scope of 
collective bargaining to include "wages, hours, standards of productivity and perform-
ance and any other terms and conditions of employment." 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 34, 359 N.E.2d at 37. 
" Labor Relations Commission: Notice of Determination of State Employee Bargaining 
Units, 1 M.L.C. 1318 (1975), See Rules of MLRC, 402 CMR 14.07. 
51 The categorization of state employees into the 10 units represented a drastic change 
from the former situation where state employees were separated into over 200 bargaining 
units represented by numerous labor organizations. 
•7 Rules of MLRC, 402 CMR 14.07: Employees of Commonwealth provides in part: 
(1) With respect to employees of the Commonwealth, excepting any employees of 
community and state colleges and universities, no petition filed under the provi-
sions of Section 4 of the Law shall be entertained, except in extraordinary circum-
stances, where the petition seeks certification in a bargaining unit not in substantial 
accordance with the provisions of this section. Bargaining units shall be established 
on a state wide basis, with one unit for each of the following occupational groups, 
excluding in each case all managerial and confidential employees as so defined in 
Section 1 of the Law: 
NONPROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES: 
UNIT 1: Administrative and Clerical 
including all nonprofeBBional employees whose work involves the keeping or exami-
nation of records and accounts, or general office work; 
UNIT 2: Service, Maintenance and Institutional 
excluding building trades and crafts and institution security; 
UNIT 3: Building Trades and Crafts; 
UNIT 4: Institutional Security, 
including correctional officers and other employees whose primary function is the 
protection of the property of the employer, protection of persons on the employer's 
· premises, and enforcement of rules and regulations of the employer against other 
employees; 
UNIT 5: Law Enforcement, 
including all employees with power to arrest, whose work involves primarily the 
enforcement of statutes, ordinances, and regulations, and the preservation of public 
order. 
11
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sen ted by Local 1242.58 On March 31, 1975, Local 1242 demanded bar-
gaining with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan District Commis-
sion. 59 The Commissioner of the MDC refused, relying upon G.L. c. 
150E60 and the regulations of the Labor Relations Commission. Local 
1242 then brought suit seeking to compel the MDC to negotiate. 61 On 
April 24, 1975 the Labor Relations Commission notified the parties that 
a conference would be held on May 14 and 19, 1975 regarding the repre-
sentation questions raised in Units 2 and 3. Thereupon, Local 1242 
brought suit seeking to enjoin the Labor Relations Commission and the 
Commissioner of the MDC from interfering with its representative sta-
tus. The suit sought to have the superior court determine the effect of 
the subsequently enacted G.L. c. 150E on the pre-existing unit structure 
as well as determining whether MDC employees were employees of a 
separate "district" or of the Commonwealth as defined by G.L. c. 150E, 
section 1.62 Local 1242's position was that the MDC was a district within 
the meaning of G.L. c. 150E, section 1 and that the employees could not 
properly be included within the state employee's bargaining units.63 The 
two suits were consolidated for trial in the superior court where they 
were both dismissed on defendant's motion. Local 1242 then appealed 
to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court removed the mat-
ter.64 
The Supreme Judicial Court, concluding that the issue of employer 
is a question of law, took note of a recent Appeals Court decision which 
had held that the MDC despite its name was not a district but an agency 
of the Commonwealth. 65 The Court after reviewing the fiscal structure 
of the MDC confirmed this "legal" determination of the issue and af-
firmed the Commission." 
.. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 33, 359 N.E.2d at 37. 
" I d. at 36, 359 N .E.2d at 39. 
10 G.L. c. 150E, § 1, altered the definition of the Commonwealth as employer by desig-
nating the Commissioner of Administration and Finance as the sole authorized represent-
ative of the Commonwealth for collective bargaining purposes. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 32, 359 N.E.2d at 37. Local 1242 had for several years been 
the certified bargaining representative for 1800 MDC employees. ld. 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 33, 359 N.E.2d at 37. The representation issue turned upon 
whether MDC employees were state employees or whether they were employed by a 
"district." G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
•• I d. at 38, 359 N .E.2d at 39. 
" Id. at 32, 359 N.E.2d at 37. 
15 Mitchell v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 878, 351 
N.E.2d 536. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 41, 359 N.E.2d at 41. In response to the MDC and the 
Commission's argument that Local 1242 had failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
and therefore that the Court should not reach the merits of the dispute, the Court stated: 
The question whether MDC employees are State employees for the purposes of G .L. 
c. 150E is a pure question of law the resolution of which is not uniquely committed 
12
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The Court, apparently realizing that it was coming very close to mak-
ing factual determinations in the first instance, went on to emphasize 
that true factual determinations were to be left to the agency. 67 The 
Court may well have trod this fine line in an effort to avoid unnecessary 
litigation, although recognizing that it was undermining the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Gallagher case treatment of 
the exhaustion doctrine may then be contrasted with the treatment of 
the same issue by the courts in Clover Leaf and Sullivan. 
Local 1242 could have chosen to join in an election in Units 2 and 3 
and had it won such an election precluded the necessity of litigation. 
This would support the rationale for the exhaustion doctrine since it 
would avoid litigating issues which might well become moot. The 
Gallagher case should also be contrasted with the Clover Leaf and 
Sullivan cases in its treatment of appeals of representation case matters. 
The issues in Gallagher clearly arise out of a representation case. Local 
1242's petition for injunctive relief was in effect an appeal of the Com-
mission's decision to abrogate Local 1242's certification by accepting 
petitions for its representation in units which included parts of Local 
1242's MDC bargaining unit. Under Jordan Marsh, it would seem clear 
that Local 1242 could not challenge the unit determination directly. 
Under Sullivan it would seem that if Local 1242 participated in the 
election and lost, it would be unable to appeal. Nor would filing objec-
tions to the conduct of the election obviate the non-appealability of 
representation cases. Yet despite the apparent non-appealability of this 
Commission decision Local1242 was able to appeal the Commission's 
decision and get the Supreme Judicial Court to review the case on its 
merits. 
The Gallagher, Clover Leaf and Sullivan cases would seem to present 
a panorama of inconsistency on the part of the courts when dealing with 
representation case matters and their appealability. What emerges is 
the following situation: if the Commission has decided a representation 
case on its merits the Court will bypass procedural infirmities and re-
view the Commission on the merits;88 if the Commission has dismissed 
on procedural grounds without reaching the merits the Court will seek 
to affirm on these procedural grounds; 88 if the Court is unable to reach 
a decision on these procedural grounds it will try to both avoid a remand 
and affirm the Commission by looking at the merits. 70 While this repre-
to resolution through administrative fact-finding. 
ld. The Court gave as reasons for its reaching the merits the fact that administrative 
proceedings would only further lengthen and complicate the matter. ld. 
17 ld. 
18 See text at notes 51-67 supra, discussing Gallagher. 
" See text at notes 1-41 supra, discussing Clover Leaf. 
70 See text at notes 42·50 supra, discussing Sullivan. 
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sents a nice position for the Commission it hardly assists practitioners 
in seeking review of representation case matters. 
§ 16.2. Commission Decisions of Procedures. In Town of Andover, 1 
the Commission affirmed on appeal a Hearing Officer's decision in 
which the appellant sought to reverse the decision on the premise that 
the Hearing Officer had not decided the case in a timely fashion. In 
Andover approximately eleven months had passed between the date for 
submission of briefs and the issuance of the Hearing Officer's decision. 
Relying on the language of section 11 of chapter 150E of the General 
Laws, and Article III, section 28 of the Rules and Regulations of the 
Labor Relations Commission, the appellant argued that the Hearing 
Officer must decide the case immediately at the time of submission of 
the briefs. 2 The Commission's response was that such a conclusion 
would preclude the thoughtful deliberation necessary in making the 
decision.3 It might be added that it would also have limited the discre-
tion of the Hearing Officers, most of whom now routinely issue fairly 
lengthy opinions with their decision. 
In City of Cambridge and Cambridge Hospital House Officers 
Association, 4 the Commission interpreted its own general rules and regu-
lations on motions as being sufficiently broad to grant a right to employ 
summary judgment procedures. The Commission relied on the preced-
ents of the federal courts as well as the NLRB.5 In Cambridge City 
Hospital the representation case, out of which the unfair labor practice 
case arose, had been fully litigated. Thus in the unfair labor practice 
case, which involved an employer's refusal to bargain, 6 the Commission 
determined that no triable issue of fact remained.7 The summary judg-
ment in the Cambridge City Hospital case is also supported by the 
express language of section 11 of chapter lOE, which provides: 
§ 16.2. I 4 M.L.C. 1086 (1977). 
2 G.L. c. 150E, § 11. At the conclusion of the hearing, the member or agent shall 
determine whether a practice prohibited under section 10 has been committed and if so, 
he shall issue an order requiring it or him to cease and desist from such prohibited 
practice. If the member or agent determines that a practice prohibited under section 10 
has not been committed, he shall iseue an order dismissing the complaint. 
3 4 M.L.C. at 1091. 
' 4 M.L.C. 1044 (1977). 
' See 4 M.L.C. at 1050 citing Hamilton Electronics Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 1400, 83 
L.R.R.M. 2543 (4th Cir. 1973); Southern Industrial Laundry v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 417, 75 
L.R.R.M. 2225 (5th Cir. 1970). 
' 4 M.L.C. at 1046. The focus of the litigation in the representation case was the issue 
of whether interns, residents, and fellows of the Cambridge Hospital were employees 
within the meaning of G.L. c. 150E, § 1. The Commission had examined considerable 
evidence and had made detailed findings of fact in City of Cambridge, 2 M.L.C. 1450 
(1976). 
1 4 M.L.C. at 1046. 
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whenever it is alleged that a party has refused to bargain collec-
tively in good faith with the exclusive representative as required 
in Section 10 and that such refusal is based upon a dispute involv-
ing the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, the Commission 
shall, except for good cause shown, issue an interim order requiring 
the parties to bargain pending its determination of the dispute. 
Where such interim order is issued the Commission shall hold a 
hearing on the charge in the summary manner and shall speedily 
determine the issues raised and shall make an appropriate deci-
sion.8 
Although section 11 does not provide for a summary judgment but 
merely for a summary hearing, such language evinces a clear legislative 
intent that questions of apprupriateness of the bargaining unit once 
resolved in the representation case be promptly resolved in the unfair 
labor practice proceedings, presumably so that bargaining or an appeal 
can be initiated promptly. Thus, the Commission's decision is not in-
consistent with the statute. 
In Brockton School Committee and NAGE and SEIU, Local525, 9 the 
Commission was called upon to resolve various objections to the conduct 
of the election. The issue revolved around two legal contentions made 
by trustees of Local 525, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO (Local525). The first contention was that a contract between Local 
525 and the City of Brockton barred an election conducted on March 
31, 1977. The second contention was that a representative of Local525 
who had signed an agreement for a consent election acted without au-
thority.10 As a preliminary matter the Commission reiterated its com-
mitment to Rules and Regulations Article II, § 14(e) applying an open 
period of 158-180 days before the expiration of a contract for filing of 
petitions for representation and election." The incumbent union Local 
252 alleged that its contract expired on December 31, 1977, which was 
the last date under a continuation clause. The Commission found that 
June 30, 1977, a date which was the final date under the contract, was 
the actual termination date and utilized that for determining the open 
period for filing a representation petition. The Commission noted that 
continuation clauses are a common provision in collective bargaining 
agreements but that it would not read these clauses as affecting the open 
period for filing election petitions. The Commission held that to hold 
otherwise would be to permit a contract to be extended indefinitely. 12 
• G.L. c. 150E, § 11. 
• 4 M.L.C. 1005 (1977). 
10 ld. at 1006. 
II M.L.R.C. Rules, Article n, § 5. 
o2 4 M.L.C. at 1007. 
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The incumbent local also challenged the validity of the consent elec-
tion agreement. Five days before the election the International placed 
the local under a trusteeship based on the determination that the presi-
dent of the local had been improperly elected and had therefore ex-
ceeded his authority in executing the agreement for consent election. 13 
The International then went to court seeking a temporary restraining 
order to stay the conduct of the election. The superior court refused to 
stay the election but did agree to order the Commission to impound the 
ballots. Four days later at the hearing on the preliminary injunction the 
court vacated its stay and remanded the matter to the Commission for 
action in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the con-
duct of the Commission. 14 The International then filed its challenges 
with the Commission realleging its contention that the improper elec-
tion of the local president vitiated the consent agreement. 
The Commission rejected this argument and held that since the presi-
dent was elected in November of 1976 and signed the consent election 
on February 16, 1977, the failure of the International to take any action 
until March 31, 1977 precluded this from being raised as a proper bar 
to the conduct of an election. The Commission held that the president 
had apparent authority and that no other party knew or could have 
known of the alleged internal irregularity in this election. 15 Finally, the 
Commission noted that even if the local lacked proper authority the 
Commission would have ordered an election. 18 While not saying so, the 
Commission implied that this election would have been ordered since 
the petition itself showed no irregularity, was timely filed, there was no 
objection to the unit by the employer, and the union could not have 
reasonably objected to the appropriateness of the unit since it already 
represented this unit. 
§ 16.3. Duty to Bargain. During the Survey year the Commission 
re-examined its approach to scope of bargaining issues under chapter 
150E of the General Laws. Prior to Town of Danvers1 the Commission 
had been applying private sector precedent in its scope of bargaining 
' 3 4 M.L.C. 1005. The consent agreement had been signed by Local 252's president on 
February 16, 1977 in response to a petition filed on January 12, 1977 by the National 
Association of Government Employees (NAGE) seeking certification to represent certain 
employees of the City of Brockton. Id. 
" At a conference held at the Commission offices in the presence of the parties the 
ballots were counted indicaing that Local 252 had lost the election. Id. 
•• 4 M.L.C. at 1008. 
" !d. The Commission noted that there had been no reason to believe that the president 
of Local 252 lacked authority. There had been no internal challenge to his election and 
the International had allowed him to operate unchallenged. 
§ 16.3. 1 Town of Danvers and Local 2038, lnt'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 
3 M.L.C. 1559 (1977). 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/19
350 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §16.3 
decisions.2 Such precedent, however, was developed under the National 
Labor Relations Act3 and had been applied by the Commission without 
careful analysis as to its propriety in the public sector in general or 
pursuant to chapter 150E in particular. 
In the private sector issues at the bargaining table have traditionally 
been classified as either mandatory, permissive, or illegal. A party to 
collective bargaining has traditionally been found to have committed an 
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain over a mandatory subject. 4 
A party may or may not bargain on a permissive subject of bargaining, 
but will commit an unfair labor practice if it insists to the point of 
impasse on the inclusion of its proposal in a contract.5 There is also a 
narrow area of illegal subjects of bargaining.8 
In Danvers the International Association of Firefighters argued that 
the mandatory/permissive/illegal scheme is not applicable under chap-
ter 150E. The Association suggested, rather, that the Commission adopt 
a "conflicts" test.7 Under such a proposed test no subject could ever be 
excluded from the bargaining process. Further, no contract provision 
could ever be illegal unless it was in conflict with a statute, regulation, 
or rule omitted from section 7 of chapter 150E. 
Section 7 states that when terms of a collective bargaining agreement 
conflict with certain statutes, regulations, or rules, the terms of the 
agreement shall prevail.8 Contending that section 7 of chapter 150E 
• Town of Natick, M.U.P.-326, 351 (1973) enf. denied on other grounds, Town of Natick 
v. Labor Relations Commission, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 31, 339 N.E.2d 900. 
s 29 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1976). 
4 NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
• Id. 
• ABBociated General Contractor v. NLRB, 465 F.2d 327, 80 L.R.R.M. 3157 (7th Cir. 
1972) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108, 82 L.R.R.M. 2139 (1973). 
1 3 M.L.C. at 1563. 
• G.L. c. 150E, § 7 provides: 
(d) If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the employer and the exclusive 
representative contains a conflict between matters which are within the scope of 
negotiations pursuant to section six of this chapter and any municipal personnel 
ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation; the regulations of a police chief pursuant to 
section ninety-seven A of chapter forty-one; the regulations of a fire chief or other 
head of a fire department pursuant to chapter forty-eight; any of the following 
statutory provisions or rules or regulations made thereunder: 
(a) The second paragraph of section twenty-eight of chapter seven; 
(a-\iz) section six E of chapter twenty-one; 
(b) sections fifty to fifty-six inclusive, of chapter thirty-five; 
(c) section twenty-four A, paragraphs (4) and (5) of section forty-five, para-
graphs (1), (4), and (10) of section forty-six, section forty-nine, as it applies 
to allocation appeals, and section fifty-three of chapter thirty; 
(e) sections one hundred and eight D to one hundred and eight I, inclusive, 
and sections one hundred and eleven to one hundred and eleven I, inclusive, 
of chapter forty-one: 
17
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focuses attention on the product of collective bargaining rather than the 
process, the Union argued that chapter 150E mandated a wide-open, if 
not unlimited, scope of bargaining pursuant to which any topic desired 
to be discussed by either party could be the subject of negotiation-even 
if the resulting agreement could not be incorporated into a collective 
bargaining agreement because of a section 7 conflict.9 
The Commission, after considerable discussion of the specific lan-
guage of G.L. c. 150E,l0 its legislative history ,I' and past practice of the 
(0 section thirty-three A of chapter forty-four; 
(g) sections fifty-seven to fifty-nine inclusive, of chapter forty-eight; 
(g- V2) section sixty-two of chapter ninety-two; 
(h) sections fourteen to seventeen E, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and 
forty-seven; 
(i) sections thirty to forty-two, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-
nine; 
(j) section twenty-eight A of chapter seven; 
(k) sections forty-five to fifty, inclusive, of chapter thirty; 
(1) sections thirty, thirty-three and thirty-nine of chapter two hundred and 
seventeen; 
(m) sections sixty-one, sixty-three and sixty-eight of chapter two hundred 
and eighteen; 
(n) sections sixty-nine to seventy-three, inclusive, and seventy-five, eighty 
and eighty-nine of chapter two hundred and twenty-one; 
(o) section eighty-four, eighty-five, eighty-nine, and ninety-p.ine B of chapter 
two hundred and seventy-six, the terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment shall prevail. 
1 3 M.L.C. at 1565 n.11. 
10 The Commission focused on section 6 to determine the scope of bargaining under G .L. 
c. 150E which states: 
The employer and the exclusive representative shall meet at reasonable times, 
including meetings in advance of the employer's budget-making process and shall 
negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, standards of productivity and 
performance, and any other terms and conditions of employment, but such obliga-
tion shall not compel either party to agree to a proposal or make a concession. 
(emphasis added) 
The Commission attached little significance to the word "any" as a modifier of the phrase 
"other terms and conditions of employment" in section 6, because of the lack of consist-
ency throughout the statute. In section 2 the legislature failed to include the word "any" 
and consequently provided in that section that employees shall enjoy collective bargaining 
merely "on questions of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment 
.... " Furthermore, if the addition of the word "any" in section 6 were interpreted to 
mandate a very broad, if not unlimited, scope of bargaining, then the words "standards 
of productivity and performance" as additional subjects within the scope of bargaining 
would be superfluous. These additional subjects would be subsumed within an unlimited 
scope of bargaining. 3 M.L.C. at 1565. 
11 The Commission rejected the argument that the absence of management rights lan-
guage in section 6 of chapter 150E demonstrates legislative intent to include traditional 
managerial prerogatives. The Commission concluded that the legislature, by borrowing 
the traditional language of the National Labor Relations Act, intended to incorporate the 
mandatory/permissive dichotomy "which in twenty-two years of practice had become 
18
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Commission and the courts, 12 concluded that each of these factors sup-
ported its conclusion to continue the application of the manda-
tory/permissive dichotomy in public sector analysis under chapter 150E. 
The Commission, while viewing the statutory language of chapter 
150E, its legislative history, and case law precedent as support for appli-
cation of the mandatory/permissive scheme, also relied to a great degree 
on public policy considerations. Recognizing that collective bargaining 
is not the appropriate vehicle even in the private sector for all decision-
making, the Commission intimated that flexibility to manage the enter-
prise may be even more compelling in the case of the public employer. 
Thus, the Commission st~ted that the public employer has a broader 
responsibility to the community than its counterparts in the private 
sector. The government, as employer, must be responsible not merely 
to narrow corporate interests but to the overall public interest. 13 The 
Commission recognized that in collective bargaining the influence on 
the decision-making process of public sector employees is increased over 
that of citizens who are not public employees.'• The Commission viewed 
the collective bargaining process as conferring special access to govern-
mental decision-making on organized public employees. Accordingly, 
the Commission found that a duty to bargain should extend only to 
those areas in which public employees' greater influence and special 
access are appropriate: those decisions which have a direct impact on 
terms and conditions of their employment. 15 The Commission estab-
lished a balancing test under which bargaining is mandatory over sub-
ject matters which have greater impact on working conditions of the 
employees than on the level of delivery of public services. 18 
The Commission in Danvers adopted a generic approach to scope of 
bargaining issues. It is clear from the decision that a party which refuses 
virtually synonymous with the method of determining the scope of bargaining." 3 M.L.C. 
at 1568. 
12 The Commission in Town of Natick, M.U.P.-326, 351 (1973), enf. denied on other 
grounds, Town of Natick v. Labor Relations Commission, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 31, 339 
N.E.2d 900, formally adopted the mandatory/permissive framework of analysis. See Ap-
pendix to Commission decision. See also Town of Marblehead, 1 M.L.C. 1140 (1974); 
Town of North Andover, 1 M.L.C. 1103 (1974); Groton School Comm., 1 M.L.C. 1221 
(1974); City of Salem, M.U.P.-309 (1972). 
The Court has been presented with numerous opportunities to express its opinion on 
scope of bargaining issues, but has expressly declined to do so. See School Comm. of 
Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145, and School Comm. of 
Hanover v. Curry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144. 
13 Town of Danvers and Local 2038, lnt'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, CLC, 3 
M.L.C. 1559, 1570-71 (1977). 
" See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L. J. 
1156 (1970). 
•• 3 M.L.C. at 1571. 
" /d. at 1577. 
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to bargain over a given proposal must specify its objection to the pro-
posal in order to avoid violation of chapter 150E; a general refusal to 
bargain over a proposal which, if subjected to the collective bargaining 
process might give rise to either mandatory or permissive subjects is 
insufficient. 17 Thus, the Commission stated: 
At the federal level, it has long been held that the generic subject 
of the assignment of unit work to non-unit personnel is amanda-
tory subject of bargaining .... These and other cases, however, 
have often made distinctions between the duty to bargain over the 
impact of such assignments, and the duty to bargain over the 
initial decision to assign. In this case, since the Town refused to 
negotiate over the general topic without revealing its specific 
objections to the Union's initial proposal, we need not reach the 
issue of impact versus decision,l8 
Following its affirmance of the mandatory/permissive model, the 
Commission proceeded to apply it to the specific issues raised in 
Danvers. As a result the Commission held that a Union's proposal re-
quiring minimum manning on a per-shift basis in a fire department to 
be a permissive subject of bargaining. 19 In Danvers the Town had re-
fused to bargain over a Union proposal requiring that a minimum num-
ber of personnel be on duty at all times; and that personnel absent from 
a scheduled tour be replaced by people called back to work on an over-
time basis. According to the proposal this level of personnel services 
would be mandated regardless of the number of fire stations or the 
amount of firefighting equipment maintained by the Town. The Com-
mission found that this proposal would impinge upon the flexibility of 
elected public officials to determine the level of fire services to be deliv-
ered within the Town. The Commission found that safety and workload 
which were the working conditions to which the Union attempted to 
relate its proposal were too indirectly affected to classify the proposal 
as mandatory. Thus, a decision regarding the level of public services 
which will be delivered is a decision which will be made by all the 
citizens of the jurisdiction through their elected representatives and is 
not one which must be subjected to the collective bargaining process.20 
In City of Newton, 21 the Commission was faced with another scope of 
bargaining issue put forth by firefighters. In Newton the Commission 
affirmed the findings of a hearing officer and held: the number of fire 
17 Id. at 1576. 
18 ld. 
II Jd. at 1573. 
"' See Sachman, Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C. 
L. REv. 155 (1977). 
21 City of Newton and Newton Firemen's Welfare Ass'n, 4 M.L.C. 1282 (1977). 
20
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fighters on a piece of equipment when it responds to an alarm is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.22 The Commission distinguished the 
Newton "per-piece" coverage proposal from the Danuers "per-shift" 
coverage proposal by indicating that the former does not seek to man-
date the level of services to be delivered by controlling the number of 
firefighters to be maintained in the department, but merely seeks to 
mandate the number of firefighters to be assigned to a given piece of 
firefighting equipment as it responds to an alarm.23 Thus, the munici-
pality is able to increase or decrease the level of fire services delivered 
to its citizens without bargaining such change with its organized em-
ployees, but it must bargain over the number of firefighters who will 
staff a given piece of equipment as it responds to an alarm.24 
Not only did the Newton proposal not seek to influence the level of 
services, but it directly affected safety and workload of firefighters who 
normally perform firefighting tasks as part of a "company." Only after 
the apparatus leaves the fire station are the safety and workload of the 
firefighters affected by the number of firefighters available. Thus, the 
Commission viewed the point of departure from the station house to be 
a rational point at which to draw the line between permissive and man-
datory subjects of bargaining. The Commission stated that nothing in 
the Newton decision should prevent employers from keeping any num-
ber of firefighters on duty at all times to staff the needed apparatus. 21 
In Boston School Committee and Boston Teachers Union, Local 66, 
AFT, 21 the Commission held that a rule which establishes household 
residency as a condition of continued employment, promotion, or trans-
fer within the bargaining unit is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In 
Boston School Committee the employer unilaterally adopted a rule pro-
viding: 
ORDERED, that all persons hired or promoted by the School De-
partment after July 1, 1976 shall within three months of such 
hiring or promotion become residents of the City of Boston. . . 27 
Using the balancing approach of the Danuers case, the Commission 
reasoned that the impact of such a rule on the working conditions of unit 
employees far outweighed the impact which collective bargaining might 
have on the employer's ability to manage its enterprise.23 
n Id. at 1283. 
13 Id. at 1284. 
14 Id. 
21 Id. 
21 Boston School Comm. and Boston Teachers' Union, Local66, AFT, Boston School 
Comm. and Boston Association of School Administrators and Supervisors, Boston School 
Comm. and Boston Public School Building Custodians Ass'n, 3 M.L.C. 1603 (1977). 
17 Id. at 1604. 
21 I d. at 1607-08. 
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In dictum the Commission indicated that the same considerations 
would not apply where an employer establishes a residency requirement 
as a condition ofhire.29 The Commission based the distinction on section 
5 of chapter 150E which it interpreted to grant to a union the right to 
represent only members of the bargaining unit. Section 5 of chapter 
150E grants to the exclusive representative "The right to act for and 
negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit . . . " 
[emphasis added.)3° 
In City of Boston and Boston Typographical Union, 31 the Commission 
held that the City of Boston's economic decision to close its printing 
plant, subcontract the printing work, and lay off or transfer its printing 
plant employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Prior to the 
expiration of the then current contract the City informed the Union that 
it had made a tentative decision to close its printing plant on North 
Street and to abolish the positions of most of the employees because of 
the fiscal crisis facing the City.32 The City did not propose to cut back 
on printing services. Rather, it proposed to continue the current volu~e 
through the use of an expanded copy facility at City Hall and by subcon-
tracting certain services. 33 
The Commission analogized to federal precedent established in 
Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB34 in which the Supreme Court held 
that the employer was obligated to bargain over the issue of whether to 
subcontract plant maintenance work for economic reasons. While ac-
knowledging that Fibreboard has been variously interpreted by the 
NLRB and the courts as to the scope of its holding, the Commission 
refused to adopt either a broad or narrow interpretation of the 
Fibreboard holding. Rather, the Commission applied the Fibreboard 
standard of analysis which balances management needs for discretion 
to make operational judgments against the legitimate concerns of em-
ployees to protect jobs, wages, and working conditions.35 
A key element in the Commission's finding that the decision to sub-
contract in this case was a mandatory subject of bargaining was the 
21 ld. at 1608. 
30 ld. 
31 City of Boston and Boston Typographical Union #13, 4 M.L.C. 1202 (1977). 
32 ld. at 1204. 
33 ld . 
.. 379 u.s. 203 (1964). 
35 In finding that the decision to subcontract in Boston Typographical Union is a man-
datory subject of bargaining the Commission stated: 
Where labor costs are the major factor controlling a management decision it is 
certainly within the realm of possibility that the bargaining representative could 
make a response which could alter, modify, or ameliorate those concerns. To deny 
bargaining under such circumstances is to conclude that the union could make no 
response capable of making the bargaining ~nit competitive with the subcontractor. 
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continuing consumption of a constant level of printing services. For the 
City's decision to cut back on printing services would be a managerial 
level of services decision within the meaning of Town of Danvers36 and 
accordingly would be a permissive subject of bargaining.37 
Boston Typographical Union provides only minimal guidance to prac-
titioners on the bargainability of changes in the operation of governmen-
tal enterprises involving significant capital changes, closure, or technol-
ogical or operational changes. Such issues will be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. 
The Supreme Judicial Court as well as the Commission decided scope 
of bargaining issues during the Survey year. It did so in several arbitra-
tion cases in an ex post facto manner. 
In School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 38 the Court 
affirmed an arbitrator's award even though it also made findings on 
subjects which are beyond the scope of mandatory bargaining even 
though submitted to interest arbitration by agreement of the parties 
pursuant to section 9 of chapter 150E. The School Committee took the 
position that the award was beyond the arbitrator's authority arguing 
that the whole abitral process must be restricted to mandatory subjects 
of bargaining under the fifth paragraph of section 9 of chapter 150E 
which provides: 
Any arbitration award in a proceeding voluntarily agreed to by the 
parties to resolve an impasse shall be binding on the parties and 
on the appropriate legislative body and made effective and en-
forceable pursuant to the provisions of ... [G.L. c. 150C], pro-
vided that said arbitration proceeding has been authorized by the 
appropriate legislative body or in the case of school employees, by 
the appropriate school committee.39 
The Court rejected the argument of the School Committee that the 
word "impasse" in paragraph five of section 9 conveys the thought that 
only mandatory subjects of bargaining may be arbitrated pursuant to 
that section.40 Rather, the Court found that once impasse is reached on 
mandatory subjects, the parties may agree to submit to interest arbitra-
tion both mandatory subjects and unsettled permissive subjects over 
which they have been bargaining.41 
31 See note 1 supra. 
37 See text at notes 16-20 supra. 
31 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069, 363 N.E.2d 485. 
31 G.L. c. 150E, § 9. 
'" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069, 1074-75, 363 N.E.2d 485, 488. 
" In so finding, the Court analogized to private sector precedent in grievance arbitra-
tion, indicating that where nonmandatory items have been included in an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause the courts have enforced grievance arbitration awards 
23
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In this case, the three disputed subjects dealt with the payment of 
severance pay owing to persons who had retired, resigned, or died, the 
arrangements surrounding the choice of trustees of a "health and wel-
fare" fund and the provision of reading specialists for programs for 
pupils with certain reading deficiencies. 42 While not classifying any of 
these three topics as mandatory subjects of bargaining the Court found 
each to be a proper subject of voluntary interest arbitration. Citing 
Boston Teachers Union v. School Committee of Boston43 and two other 
cases decided during the Survey year, u the Court warned that there is 
a limit to the scope of voluntary interest arbitration and that public 
officials should not regard the fifth paragraph of section 9 as an easy way 
out of their responsibilities to the electorate.45 The Court further stated 
that it would examine such issues on a case-by-case basis.41 
§ 16.4. Tenure and Job Abolitions. In future histories of public 
sector labor relations, it may well be that the 1970's will be character-
ized as the Age of Retrenchment. Although there have been cutbacks 
among many employee groups, teachers have been particularly hard hit 
by a combination of factors, chief among which have been decreasing 
school enrollments and economic pressures leading to a decline in school 
programs and services characterized as "non-essential." During the 
Survey year, the Appeals Court rendered two decisions involving school 
employees whose positions were abolished for economic reasons. Both 
cases affirm the power of a school committee, acting in good faith, to 
eliminate positions held by tenured teachers for reasons of economy, 
system reorganization, or educational policy. They also, however, affirm 
the right of employees to the protections given by tenure statutes.• 
In order to understand the cases, one must know the relevant portions 
of the statutes at issue. Section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws 
states that teachers who have served for three consecutive years acquire 
without regard to whether the subject in dispute was a mandatory or permissive subject 
of bargaining prior to agreement. The Court concluded that the same should result under 
G.L. c. 150C, § 1. Id. at 1075-76, 363 N.E.2d at 488-89. 
•2 Id. at 1080-82, 363 N .E.2d at 490-91. 
•• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1515, 350 N.E.2d 707. See also Grunebaum, Labor Law, 1976 
ANN. Suav. MASs. LAw § 6.5 at 169. 
u School Comm. of Danvers v. Tyman, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877; 
School Comm. of West Bridgewaterv. West Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 434, 360 N.E.2d 886. For a discussion of the cases see Student Comment§ 16.6 infra. 
a 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1069, 1079, 363 N.E.2d 485, 490. 
ald. 
§ 16.4. 1 G.L. c. 71, §§ 41, 42, 42A, 43, and 43A. The teacher tenure statutes are 
complex and cover a multitude of situations. Only those portions relevant to the cases to 
be discussed will be mentioned. 
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tenure upon election to their fourth year of service. Under section 42 of 
chapter 71, a tenured teacher can be dismissed only by a two-thirds vote 
of the whole school committee. Under the same section, tenured teach-
ers can be dismissed only for good cause and only after a notice of the 
charges and a hearing, at which they are entitled to counsel. 2 Appeals 
of tenure dismissals may be brought in the superior court, 3 and success-
ful appellants are entitled to their appeal costs (including attorney's 
fees) under section 43B of chapter 71. 
Section 38H of chapter 71 makes the teacher tenure statutes applica-
ble to school librarians. The plaintiff in Woodward v. School Committee 
of Sharon' was employed at Sharon High School as a "library assistant" 
for one year and a "librarian" for the subsequent three years.5 During 
her first year, Mrs. Woodward was paid on a per diem rate and worked 
181 of the 182 days in that school year. • For her three years as a 
"librarian," she was paid on the union contract scale and worked a full 
year.7 For all four years, her duties were the same.8 In April of 1973, her 
third year as "librarian," the Sharon School Committee voted to termi-
nate Mrs. Woodward's position at the end of the school year for budget-
ary reasons. • She was notified that she would not be employed for the 
1973-1974 school year, but the Committee made no attempt to comply 
with the procedural provisions of the tenure statute. 10 
Mrs. Woodward filed suit, contending that she was tenured and that 
the Committee had failed to give her the procedural protections of G .L. 
c.71, § 42. 11 She sought reinstatement and damages. The superior court 
2 G.L. c. 71, § 42. 
• G.L. c. 71, § 43A. 
• 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 130, 359 N .E.2d 966. 
1 Id. at 132-33, 359 N.E.2d at 968-69. 
' I d. at 132, 359 N .E.2d at 968. 
7 Id. at 133, 359 N.E.2d at 968-69. 
• Id. at 133, 359 N.E.2d at 969. 
I Id. 
II Id. 
11 G.L. c. 71, § 42 provides: 
The school committee may dismiss any teacher, but no teacher and no superin-
tendent, other than a union superintendent and the superintendent of schools in 
the city of Boston, shall be dismissed unless by a two-thirds vote of a whole commit-
tee. In every such town a teacher or superintendent employed at discretion under 
the preceding section shall not be dismissed, except for inefficiency, incapacity, 
conduct unbecoming a teacher or superintendent, insubordination or other cause, 
nor unless at least thirty days, exclusive of customary vacation periods, prior to the 
meeting at which the vote is to be taken, he shall have been notified of such 
intended vote; nor unless, if he so requests, he shall have been furnished by the 
committee with a written charge or charges of the cause or causes for which his 
dismissal is proposed; nor unless, if he so requests, he has been given a hearing 
before the school committee which may be either public or private at the discretion 
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entered a judgment which: 1) declared that Mrs. Woodward had been 
on tenure as a librarian at the critical point in time; 2) declared that 
the Committee had not complied with the tenure law; and 3) ordered 
that Mrs. Woodward be reinstated with back pay, all fringe benefits, 
and interest.12 The School Committee appealed. 
The first issue for the Appeals Court was whether or not the plaintiff 
was indeed tenured, i.e., whether her year ofservice as a "library assist-
ant" would count in computing her years of service. 13 If it did not, she 
would not, as of April 1973, have had the three full years of service 
required for tenure status since she had not yet completed three full 
years as "librarian." The court found that plaintiff was tenured. 14 It 
noted that her service as library assistant had been regular and continu-
ous rather than intermittent since she had worked 181 out of a 182-day 
school year. 10 Interestingly, and importantly, the court also devoted a 
paragraph to the insignificance it attached to job titles. The master had 
found that Mrs. Woodward's position as a "library assistant" involved 
duties which were no different from those she performed when her title 
was changed." Quoting from LaMarsh v. School Committee of 
Chicopee, 17 the Appeals Court stated that it is "the character of the 
labor performed which is ... important in determining the precise 
position held when (as here) that is not definitely established by official 
records."18 
There was no contention by the Committee that plaintiff had been 
given the procedural protections of the tenure law. The Appeals Court 
held that she had been dismissed in violation of the statute. 19 As a 
of the school committee and at which he may be represented by counsel, present 
evidence and call witnesses to testify in his behalf and examine them; nor unless 
the charge or charges shall have been substantiated; nor unless, in the case of a 
teacher, the superintendent shall have given the committee his recommendations 
thereon. The change of marital status of a female teacher or superintendent shall 
not be considered cause for dismissal under this section. Neither this nor the pre-
ceding sections shall affect the right of a committee to dismiss a teacher whenever 
an actual decrease in the number of pupils in the schools of the town renders such 
action advisable. In case a decrease in the number of pupils in the schools of a town 
renders advisable the dismissal of one or more teachers, a teacher who is serving at 
the discretion of a school committee under section forty-one shall not be dismissed 
if there is a teacher not serving at discretion whose position the teacher serving at 
the discretion is qualified to fill. No teacher or superintendent who has been law-
fully dismissed shall receive compensation for services rendered thereafter. 
12 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 131, 359 N.E.2d at 968. 
13 Id. at 133, 359 N.E.2d at 969. 
14 Id. at 135, 359 N.E.2d at 969-70. 
11 I d. at 132, 359 N .E.2d at 968. 
11 Id. at 133-34, 359 N.E.2d at 969. 
17 272 Mass. 15, 18, 172 N.E.117, 118 (1930). 
18 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 134, 359 N.E.2d at 969. 
11 ld. at 136, 359 N.E.2d at 970. 
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remedy, however, the court did not order Mrs. Woodward's reinstate-
ment.20 Rather, it awarded her damages for the period from September 
1973 until such time as she was lawfully dismissed in accordance with 
the requirements of G.L. c.71, § 42.21 Plaintiff also received her costs of 
appeal under section 43B of chapter 71.22 
The Woodward court cited as authority for its decision Nutter v. 
School Committee of Lowell, 23 a case it handed down on the same day 
as Woodward. Plaintiffs in Nutter were the four tenured school adjust-
ment counselors employed by the Lowell School Committee.24 In Febru-
ary of 1975, the Lowell School Committee voted 4-3 to abolish their 
positions at the end of that school year as an economy measure. 25 
Plaintiffs appealed to the superior court under section 43A of chapter 
71 of the General Laws. 21 The trial judge found that they failed to prove 
their allegations that the vote was a subterfuge or had been taken in bad 
faith. He issued a judgment which declared the vote effective to elimi-
nate plaintiffs' positions. He further declared that the vote was not a 
vote to dismiss tenured teachers within the meaning of the tenure law. 
Additionally, however, the superior court, without explanation, ordered 
plaintiffs to be placed in other positions and gave them their court costs 
without mentioning attorneys' fees. All parties appealed. 27 
21 According to the master's finding the plaintiff had already secured employment as a 
librarian for the remainder of the school year in question. Id. at 137, 359 N.E.2d at 970. 
11 Id. at 136-37, 359 N.E.2d at 970. The case was remanded to the superior court on the 
issue of mitigation of damages since the plaintiff had secured employment as a librarian 
for the remainder of the school year prior to the Committee's lawful termination of the 
position in compliance with section 42 of chapter 71. Id. 
zz I d. at 138, 359 N .E.2d at 970. 
zz 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 120, 359 N.E.2d 962. 
14 Id. at 120, 359 N.E.2d at 963. 
21 Id. at 121 n.4, 359 N.E.2d at 963 n.4. 
21 G. L. c. 71, § 43A provides: 
Any teacher or superintendent of schools, employed at discretion who has been 
dismissed by vote of a school committee under the provisions of section forty-two 
or section sixty-three may, within thirty days after the vote of dismissal appeal 
therefrom to the superior court in the county in which he was employed. The court 
shall advance the appeal for a speedy hearing and after such notice to the parties 
as it deems reasonable hear the cause "de novo". If the court finds in favor of the 
school committee, the vote of the school committee shall be affirmed; otherwise it 
shall be reversed and the appellant shall be reinstated to his position without loss 
of compensation. The decision of the court shall be final, except as to matters of 
law. 
27 It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the remedy granted by the trial court with 
its conclusions oflaw. The court appears to have found for the defendant school committee 
on all issues of law, but then awarded to plaintiffs most of the relief they requested, with 
the exception of attorneys' fees and reinstatement to positions which had been abolished 
in compliance with the law. The trial court did, however, order that plaintiffs receive other 
positions in the school system. In the Appeals Court, plaintiffs prevailed on the legal issues 
in that the court held that they had been dismissed in violation of the tenure law. In terms 27
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On appeal, the principal question was whether section 42 of G.L. 
chapter 71 applied.28 The court held that it did, and that all of the 
plaintiffs had been dismissed in violation of the tenure law.zv Its analysis 
is both sound and useful as an elucidation of the tenure law in the 
retrenchment situation. 
As noted above, a tenured teacher can be dismissed only by a two-
thirds vote.30 The Nutter dismissal vote had been 4-3. The Appeals 
Court began by stating that no one could any longer question that a 
school committee, acting in good faith, could abolish a position by sim-
ple majority vote. If the vote resulted in the dismissal of tenured teach-
ers, however, it had to be a two-thirds vote.31 Rejecting the School Com-
mittee's argument that the vote was a general salary revision under G.L. 
c. 71, § 43, the court found that it was, in fact, a dismissal since plaintiffs 
were not assigned to other positions and their salary source was com-
pletely eliminated. az 
An additional requirement of the tenure law is that dismissal be for 
"good cause."33 The court harmonized a school committee's power to 
abolish tenured teachers' positions with the tenure law by finding that 
abolition of a position constitutes good cause for dismissal within the 
meaning of G.L. c.71, § 42.34 
The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to their procedural 
rights. 31 An interesting aspect of the case was the court's rejection of the 
Committee's futility defense. The Committee had alleged that, under 
the circumstances, the holding of an adversary type hearing such as that 
required by the tenure law would have been pointless. The court re-
of relief, however, plaintiffs, while obtaining an award of attorneys' fees, were not ordered 
reinstated. Rather, the court ruled that they were entitled to lost wages frdm the effective 
date of the illegal dismissal to such time as they were dismissed in compliance with the 
law. 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 359 N.E.2d at 966. The Appeals Court made 
no comment on the apparent inconsistencies in this case at the trial court level. 
21 See note 11 supra for the text of G.L. c. 71, § 42. Of particular importance is the 
procedural requirement in § 42 that a tenured teacher may only be dismissed by a two-
thirds vote of the school committee. 
21 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 120, 126, 359 N.E.2d 962, 965. 
30 See note 28 supra. 
11 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 124, 359 N.E.2d at 964-65. 
11 /d. at 124-25, 359 N.E.2d at 965. 
11 G.L. c. 71, § 42 provides in part: 
In every such town a teacher or superintendent employed at discretion under the 
preceding section shall not be dismissed, except for inefficiency, incapacity, con-
duct unbecoming a teacher or superintendent, insubordination or other good cause 
u In so harmonizing the court noted that its solution was consistent with its view that 
certain other provisions of§ 42 excuse compliance where dismissal is prompted by declin-
ing enrollments and also with the authority entrusted to school committees under § 37 of 
chapter 71. 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 359 N.E.2d at 965. 
II /d. 
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sponded by noting that the 4-3 vote created obvious room for doubt as 
to whether the proponents of abolition would have succeeded had a two-
thirds vote been taken after a hearing. 31 
As relief, plaintiffs were awarded damages from September of 1975 
until they were lawfully dismissed. The court noted that they could not 
be reinstated to positions which had been abolished. Plaintiffs also re-
ceived their costs, including attorneys' fees.37 
Neither Woodward nor Nutter will be reviewed by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court. If cases raising these issues do at some point reach the Court, 
however, it is fairly safe to assume that the principles enunciated by the 
Appeals Court would stand. Both decisions are based on sound prece-
dent and solid statutory interpretation. Additionally, they reflect the 
approach of the Supreme Judicial Court in School Committee o{Brain-
tree v. Raymond18 that a school committee does not abolish all of the 
protection to which a teacher is entitled under a union contract when it 
abolishes his/her position. It is difficult to believe that the Court would 
uphold employee rights established through collective bargaining while 
denying the statutory benefits of the tenure iaw. 
The cases are thought-provoking and establish several significant 
points. First, they are a caution to public employers that the courts will 
look to the substance rather than the form of the employment relation-
ship for the purpose of determining tenure rights. Secondly, tenure dis-
missals are expensive since employees are entitled to adversarial-type 
procedural rights and to costs and attorney's fees should a dismissal be 
found to be illegal. From the employee point of view, the cases are clear 
in stating that economic motivations are good cause for dismissal. Addi-
tionally, employees cannot hope for reinstatement to the same position 
as a remedy for an illegal dismissal. From both an employer and an 
employee perspective, the cases may also be significant in providing an 
increased inducement to deal with retrenchments through collective 
bargaining. Section 8 of chapter 150E of the General Laws provides that, 
where an employee elects arbitration of his rights in a dismissal case, 
arbitration shall be the exclusive method of grievance resolution, not-
withstanding the tenure law.81 Thus, it would appear that an employee 
must elect between redress through his collective bargaining agreement 
or through the tenure statute. Assuming continued retrenchments, it 
may be to the advantage of both sides to deal with the problem in an 
• ld. at 126 n.8, 359 N.E.2d at 965 n.8. 
17 /d. at 127-28, 359 N.E.2d at 966. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. 
• G.L. c. 150E, § 8 also gives the Labor Relations Commission the power to order final 
and binding arbitration when it ia not contained in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. For a diacuaaion of Commiaaion cases on so-called "Section 8 orders" see 
Student Comment, § 16.6 infra. 
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orderly, mutually agreeable manner, thus avoiding the lengthy and ex-
pensive litigation represented by Woodward and Nutter. 
It should not be thought, however, that these cases answer all ques-
tions arising under the tenure law. In Nutter, there is some interesting 
language in an area in which litigation can be expected. Section 42 of 
chapter 71 states that nothing in the tenure law shall affect a school 
committee's right to dismiss a teacher "whenever an actual decrease in 
the number of pupils in the schools of the town renders such action 
advisable." The Nutter court stated that this provision represents the 
single instance in which compliance with the procedural protections of 
the statute is excused. 40 This proposition is dicta which will certainly be 
contested. An additional ambiguity appears in the. final provision of 
G.L. c.71, § 42. This sentence states that, if teachers are to be dismissed 
because of decreased enrollments, no tenured teacher can be dismissed 
if there is a non-tenured teacher holding a position the individual with 
tenure is "qualified" to fill. Litigation disputing the meaning of 
"qualified" is to be anticipated as the Age of Retrenchment continues. 
§ 16.5. Arbitral Authority and Procedure Under the Arbitration 
Statute. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court handed 
down a significant series of decisions which brought public sector labor 
arbitration to maturity within the general framework of longstanding 
private sector law on both the state' and federa!Z levels. The cases are 
School Committee of Agawam v. Agawam Education Association, 3 
School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman,' Dennis-Yarmouth Regional 
School Committee v. Dennis Teachers Association, 5 and School Com-
mittee of West Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teachers' Association. 8 
Since three of these cases involved public employers' statutory au-
thority to appoint teachers and manage the schools, 7 they contain im-
portant principles on nondelegable managerial prerogatives in the area 
of public employee reappointment and termination. Additionally, the 
cases contribute significantly to the body of grievance arbitration law 
• 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 126, 359 N.E.2d at 965. 
§16.5. 1 See, e.g., Kessler Bros., Inc. v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 339 
Mass. 301, 158 N.E.2d 871 (1959); Morceau v. Gould National Batteries, Inc. 344 Mass. 
120, 181 N.E.2d 644 (1962); Albert Greene v. Mari and Sons Flooring Company, Inc., 362 
Mass. 560, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). 
• United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 227, 359 N.E.2d 956. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 434, 360 N.E.2d 886. 
7 G.L. c. 71, §§ 37, 38 and 41. 
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the Court began to develop in this area during its 1976-1977 term.8 
Finally, they presented the long-awaited interpretations of the Massa-
chusetts labor arbitration statute, chapter 150C of the General Laws,» 
sought by practitioners faced with conflicting principles in the superior 
courts. 
The substantive aspects of the cases are discussed in a later section. 10 
This discussion of the cases will, therefore, be limited to their interpre-
tation of the arbitration statute and clarification of arbitral and judicial 
roles. 
Chapter 150C of the General Laws governs arbitration under collec-
tive bargaining agreements in both the private and public sectors. The 
cases to be discussed involve the provisions on stays of arbitration (sec-
tion 2), appeals where a stay has been denied (section 16), and vacations 
of arbitral awards (section 11). The substance of chapter 150C's stay and 
vacation sections is, in essence, the same as the principles laid down by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1960 in the "The Steelworkers' Trilogy,"11 
hereafter "The Trilogy." In the Trilogy, the Supreme Court definitively 
declared the private system of arbitration to be the preferred national 
policy for resolving private sector labor disputes, and adopted a policy 
of judicial non-intervention in the arbitration process. 12 
Because of the unique plenary statutory authority of public employ-
ers, however, both labor practitioners and the superior courts have long 
had difficulty applying the provisions of chapter 150C of the General 
Laws in cases where employees sought through arbitration to enforce 
their collective bargaining rights in areas where employers assert a con-
flict with their statutory powers.13 The following cases clarify judicial 
1 School Committee of Leominster v. Gallagher, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 378, 344 N.E.2d 
203; School Committee of Hanover v. Curry, 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144; 
School Committee·of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. 
• G.L. c. 150C as enacted by Acts of 1959, c. 546. 
11 See Student Comment § 16.6 infra. 
11 See note 2 supra. 
12 The Court eSBentially announced a "hands off'' role for the judiciary. It stated that 
the only function of the courts was to determine whether a party seeking arbitration is 
making a claim governed on its face by the contract, and all questions of contract interpre-
tation are to be left to arbitrators. United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufac-
turing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568. An order to arbitrate should not be denied unless it may be 
said with "positive aSBurance" that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpre-
tation covering the dispute, and doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-583. On 
appeal of an arbitrator's award, the courts have no business overturning arbitral construc-
tion of the contract simply because of a differing interpretation of the agreement's lan-
guage. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
599. A refusal to review the merits on appeal is the proper approach for the courts. ld., at 
596, 599. 
11 See, e.g., Eager v. Cronin, Barnstable Superior Court No. 35114, August 6, 1976 
(Lynch, J.). This case arose out of the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract. In 
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and arbitral roles and clearly enunciate the principle of minimal judicial 
involvement in the arbitration process. 
Sections 2(b) and 2(a) of chapter 150C cover proceedings to stay or 
compel arbitration respectively. With certain differences not relevant 
for this discussion, the judicial standard is the same under both sec-
tions. Under section 2(a), arbitration must be ordered by the superior 
court unless: 1) there is no agreement to arbitrate, or 2) the claim sought 
to be arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by the arbitration 
provision. The court may, pursuant to section 2(b), stay arbitration if 
there is no agreement to arbitrate or the claim is not covered by the 
arbitration provision. Under both sections, the court cannot base its 
order on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or because no 
fault or grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have been shown.•• 
Thus, the statute commands a court to look only at (1) the contract to 
see whether there is an arbitration clause, and (2) the grievance to see 
whether, on its face, it is a controversy over a contract provision covered 
by the arbitration clause. 
School Committee of Danvers v. 7)tman arose in the context of an 
appeal from an order under section 2(~) of chapter 150C granting a stay 
of arbitration.•• The Danvers School Committee had denied reappoint-
ment, and hence tenure,•• to a third-year teacher. A grievance was filed 
alleging violations of the evaluation clause of the collective bargaining 
agreement between the School Committee and the Danvers Teachers 
Association.l7 The Committee brought an action under G.L. c. 150C § 
2(b) seeking to stay arbitration. The Committee's position was that 
arbitration of the grievance was barred because, under section 41 
chapter 71 of the General Laws, the Committee had absolute power to 
pass on the question of whether or not a nontenured teacher's-contract 
should be renewed. The superior court held that the claim of evaluation 
procedure violations which the Association sought to a;rbitrate did not 
state a controversy covered by the arbitration provisions of the contract 
and granted a stay.18 Pursuant to section 16(2) of chapter 150C the order 
was appealed. 
an initial arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator determined that he had jurisdiction under 
the contract. The public employer filed an application under G.L. c. 150C to vacate the 
threshold jurisdictional decision and stay further arbitration proceedings. The court 
granted the relief sought, holding that a school committee could not delegate its statutory 
hiring authority to an arbitrator. ld. 
" G.L. c. 150C, §§ 2(a) and 2(b). 
11 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877. 
11 See § 16.4, Tenure and Job Abolition, supra, text at notes 2-3, for an explanation of 
teacher tenure laws. 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 417, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
II /d. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that arbitration should 
not have been stayed and entering an order under section 2(b) of chapter 
150C directing the parties to proceed to arbitration. 19 The Court's analy-
sis focused properly on the two issues involved. First was the section 2(b) 
question of whether there was a contractual arbitration clause which 
covered the controversy between the parties. The second issue, raised 
by the Committee in the superior court, was whether arbitration was 
barred by virtue of the Committee's statutory authority under section 
41 of chapter 71 to appoint teachers. 
The Court noted that there was an agreement by the Committee to 
follow certain evaluation procedures and to arbitrate alleged failures to 
follow the procedures. 20 Citing one of the Trilogy cases, 21 it affirmed the 
principle of section 2 of chapter 150C that arbitration should be ordered 
unless there is positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not sus-
ceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. The Com-
mittee had argued that the Association's claim was not a grievance 
which could be submitted to arbitration within the meaning of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The Court unequivocally rejected the 
notion that the meaning of the agreement was a matter for judicial 
interpretation. Such questions, the Court stated, are the province of 
arbitrators, and their decision on questions of interpretation of the con-
tract are final and not subject to review.22 Thus, the Court's inquiry was 
limited to a determination of whether or not there was an arbitration 
clause and a colorable claim of a contract violation which was covered 
by the arbitration provision. 
In dealing with the second issue, the Court rejected the committee's 
argument that arbitration should not be permitted because an arbitra-
tor might grant relief which impinged on the committee's exclusive and 
non-delegable statutory authority to award tenure. The Court stated: 
"Judicial intervention is not wananted where no conflict has arisen 
between the consequences of the arbitration proceedings called for in the 
collective bargaining agreement and any nondelegable authority of the 
school committee."23 In essence, the Court was applying traditional no-
tions of ripeness to reject the idea that a speculative future event, i.e., 
the arbitrator's award, might impinge on committee authority. As it 
noted, the arbitrator might find no contractual violation or award a 
remedy other than tenure. Arbitration should be ordered, the Court 
•• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 427, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
111 Id. at 426, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
21 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 564, 
582-83. 
22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 427, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
23 ld. at 421-22, 360 N.E.2d at 880. 
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stated, "unless no lawful relief conceivably can be awarded by the arbi-
trator. "24 
It is suggested that Danvers is a critically important step in removing 
certain arguable threshold impediments which threatened both the via-
bility of public sector labor arbitration and the judicial-arbitral balance 
which must exist if arbitration is to function as an agreed-upon method 
of dispute resolution. After Danvers, it would seem to be a rare case in 
which an employer will succeed in obtaining a judicial stay of the obliga-
tion to arbitrate. That impression is confirmed upon examination of 
another case during the Survey year in which the Supreme Judicial 
Court clarified an employer's right to appeal when a stay of arbitration 
was denied by the Superior Court. 
In School Committee of Agawam v. Agawam Education Association, 26 
the Court held that an order denying a stay of arbitration is not appeala-
ble under section 6 of chapter 150C of the General Laws. 28 In order to 
understand the case, it is necessary to realize that an employer seeking 
to avoid arbitration has three bites at the apple. The employer's claim 
is that the grievance is not arbitrable, i.e., that an arbitrator lacks 
jurisdiction to hear the case. The employer's argument can be raised 
before the superior court in an application to stay arbitration under G.L. 
section 2 of chapter 150C, before the arbitrator at the hearing, and again 
in the superior court in an application to vacate an arbitrator's award 
under'section 11 of chapter 150C. In recognition of this three-step pro-
cess, the Court determined in Agawam that a denial of a stay could not 
be appealed because such an order is not an act finally adjudicating the 
rights of the parties affected. 27 The parties still have the arbitration 
itself and court review of the arbitrator's award. It is only after judicial 
review of the award that a final adjudication of the parties' rights occurs 
and an appeal is proper. Thus, court action stands in abeyance pending 
the conclusion of the arbitration.28 
u ld. at 424, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
.. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 227, 359 N.E.2d 956. 
• G.L. c. 150C, § 16(a) states: 
An appeal may be taken from (1) an order denying an application to compel arbitra-
tion made under paragraph (a) of section two; (2) an order granting an application 
to stay arbitration made under paragraph (b) of section two; (3) an order confirming 
or denying confirmation of an award; (4) an order modifying or correcting an award; 
(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) a judgment or 
decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. Such appeal shall be 
taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgment in an action. 
21 In contrast, an order staying arbitration is a final order since no arbitration will take 
place and the party seeking redress of collective bargaining rights has no forum other than 
arbitration. As the Court noted in Agawam, orders staying arbitration are final orders 
which are appealable under G.L. c. 150C, § 16. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 227, 230, 359 N.E.2d 
956, 958. 
28 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 228-29, 359 N.E.2d at 957. 
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The two final cases interpreting chapter 150C during the Survey year 
involved applications to vacate arbitration awards pursuant to section 
11.2' 
Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School Committee v. Dennis Teachers 
Association30 was another nonrenewal of a teacher's contract in her ten-
ure year. Although the school committee felt that the issue of teacher 
contract renewal could not be delegated to an arbitrator, it proceeded 
to arbitration and bifurcated the proceeding.31 The underlying merits of 
the case involved the committee's alleged failure to follow contractual 
provisions involving teacher evaluation and maintenance of teachers' 
files.32 
At the jurisdictional hearing, the question presented to the arbitrator 
was: "Is the dispute the Association seeks to arbitrate on the merits 
which involves the non-renewal of. . . a nontenure teacher, a grievance, 
and if so, is it arbitrable?" The arbitrator held that the nonrenewal of a 
nontenured teacher's contract was a proper subject of arbitration under 
the collective bargaining agreement. 33 
Rather than proceed to the case on the merits, the committee went 
to superior court under chapter 150C, seeking an order vacating the 
arbitrator's award pursuant to section 11 and staying further proceed-
ings under section 2.114 The superior court vacated the award and stayed 
further proceedings. The legal basis for vacation of the award was that 
the decision not to renew the contract of a nontenured teacher could not 
11 G.L. c. 150C, § 11 states that the superior court shall vacate an award upon applica-
tion by a party within 30 days of delivery of the award if: 
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there 
was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, or corruption in any 
of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) the arbitra-
tors exceeded their powers or rendered an award requiring a person to commit an 
act or engage in conduct prohibited by state or federal law; (4) the arbitrators 
refused to postpone the hearing upon a sufficient cause being shown therefor or 
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the 
hearing, contrary to the provisions of section five as to prejudice substantially the 
rights of a party; (5) there was no arbitration agreement and the iBBue was not 
adversely determined in proceedings under section two and the party did not partic-
ipate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the 
award orders reinstatement of an employee with or without back pay or grants relief 
such that it would not grant or would not be granted by a court of law or equity 
shall not be ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. 
• 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883. 
31 In arbitration practice, a bifurcated approach involves an initial hearing on the iBBue 
of arbitrability (jurisdiction). An award is rendered by the arbitrator either finding juris-
diction or finding no jurisdiction and dismissing the case. When jurisdiction is found, the 
parties will then schedule a hearing on the merits of the case. 
u 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 430-31, 360 N.E.2d at 884. 
u Id. 
"' 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 431, 360 N.E.2d at 885. 
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be the subject of final and binding arbitration.36 Although ordering that 
the award be vacated, 31 the Dennis- Yarmouth Court did not discuss 
section 11. Rather, the Court focused on section 2, the provision to stay 
arbitration. In School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman, 37 supra, the 
Court held that a school committee could not legally delegate to an 
arbitrator its statutory duty and authority to make tenure decisions.38 
As noted above, however, the committee was required to arbitrate al-
leged violations of contractually agreed-upon evaluation clauses. The 
Court interpreted the question raised in Dennis- Yarmouth in light of the 
holding in Danvers and the command of section 2(b) that a court exam-
ine whether or not the dispute was a controversy covered by the arbitra-
tion provision. 
In a significant interpretation of the arbitration statute, the Court 
stated: "We regard an agreement to arbitrate a dispute which lawfully 
cannot be the subject of arbitration as equivalent to the absence of a 
controversy covered by the provision for arbitration."38 The decision 
whether to renew a nontenured teacher's contract and grant tenure 
could not legally be delegated to an arbitrator under Danvers. Thus, the 
dispute over the teacher's reappointment in Dennis- Yarmouth was not, 
under section 2(b) of chapter 150C, a "controversy [which could be] 
covered by the provision for arbitration." The arbitrator's award stating 
that the nonrenewal decision was arbitrable was vacated. 40 Again relying 
on Danvers, however, the Court concluded that arbitration of the em-
ployer's alleged violations of the evaluation provisions of the contract 
would be proper. The Court ordered arbitration of the case on the mer-
its.41 
Thus, when Danvers and Dennis- Yarmouth are read together, the 
principle which emerges is that the ultimate decision on continuation 
of employment cannot be arbitrated; what can be arbitrated is whether 
or not that decision arose from contractual violations. It is suggested 
that the lesson for practitioners is that the issue to be arbitrated must 
be framed specifically in terms of particular contract violations rather 
than broadly in terms of whether the nonrenewal decision violated the 
contract. Assuming a finding of contractual violations by the arbitrator, 
the critical question then becomes one of remedy, an issue the Supreme 
Judicial Court faced in the last case. 
School Committee of West Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teach-
35 /d. at 429, 432, 360 N.E.2d at 884, 885. 
31 /d. at 433, 360 N.E.2d at 885. 
37 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877. See text at notes 15-24 supra. 
38 /d. at 423-24, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
so 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 432, 360 N.E.2d 883, 885. 
10 /d. at 433, 360 N.E.2d at 885. 
" Id. at 429, 433, 360 N.E.2d at 884, 885-86. 
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ers' Association42 involved a teacher who was not in her tenure year when 
the school committee notified her of her nonreappointment. The griev-
ance filed on her behalf alleged numerous violations of the teachers' 
contractual evaluation clause. No stay of arbitration was sought, full 
hearings were held, and the arbitrator had ordered the teacher's rein-
statement with full back pay and benefits." The superior court judge 
vacated the award on the grounds that the nonrenewal decision could 
not be arbitrated. Further, he stated that, even if the question were 
arbitrable, reinstatement would not be a permissible form of relief. 44 The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed. It confirmed the award of lost wages 
for the subsequent school year for which the teacher was not rehired as 
a result of the contractual violations. Further, the Court approved the 
arbitral remedy of reinstatement for one year to allow the employee to 
receive the contractually agreed-upon procedures for evaluation for re-
employment. 41 
The Court focused on that part of section ll(a)(5) of chapter 150C 
which reads: " . . . the fact that the award orders reinstatement of an 
employee with or without back pay or grants relief such that it could 
not grant or would not be granted by a court of law or equity shall not 
be ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award."u After noting 
that an arbitrator could not order that a teacher be placed on tenure, 
the Court discussed an arbitrator's remedial powers in the context of a 
case involving public employers' reserved statutory authority. It af-
fmned the principle that arbitral flexibility in granting relief is desira-
ble. The Court specifically approved a standard arbitral remedy while 
noting that such a result might not be the expected outcome under 
common principles of equity or contract law.47 
It is suggested that the case is significant for several reasons. First, it 
is a reaffirmation of the principle of narrow judicial involvement in the 
arbitration process. The Court specifically states, in accordance with 
the statute and perhaps as a caution to the lower courts, that arbitrators 
have the authority to grant relief which would not or might not be 
ordered by the courts. Such an affumation may be seen implicitly as a 
confirmation of the private sector case lawu principle that only in the 
41 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 434, 360 N .E.2d 886. As noted earlier, the focus of the discussion 
in this Survey section is on the arbitration statute and clarification of judicial and arbitral 
roles. An elucidation of the Court's approach to the relief ordered in West Bridgewater is 
to be found in a later section. See Student Comment 116.6 infra. Our concern here is the 
grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award under G.L. c. 160C, 111. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 434, 360 N .E.2d at 887. 
44 Id. 
"ld. at 439, 441, 360 N.E.2d at 889, 890. 
41 I d. at 440, 360 N .E.2d at 889. 
n Id. 
" See notes 1 & 2 supra. 
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most extreme and narrow circumstances will the courts intervene in the 
arbitration process. Secondly, the case completes the cycle begun in 
Danvers and provides further guidance on how the courts will interpret 
chapter 150C of the General Laws. 
Of necessity, the cases split hairs and draw distinctions along lines 
which may be less than clear to both employees and public managers. 
They do, however, result in a reasonable balancing of the tensions be-
tween the traditional statutory authority of public employers and the 
rights of employees to bargain contracts providing meaningful protec-
tions. Additionally, they should help to remove the arbitration process 
from the courts and return it to the parties, thus diminishing judicial 
burdens and affirming the national principle that problems in the work-
place are best resolved through procedures agreed to and honored by 
those most knowledgeable and involved. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§ 16.6. The Scope of Grievance Arbitration in Public Employ-
ment: School Committee of Danvers v. Tyman1 (and two com-
panion cases)2 (Trilogy). The teachers' association and the School 
Committee of Danvers were parties to an effective collective bargaining 
agreement which provided for a four step grievance procedure culminat-
ing in final and binding arbitration.3 The agreement also provided, inter 
alia, for procedures to be followed by the Committee in evaluating the 
work performance of teachers! Anne Tyman was a teacher in her final 
§16.6. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877. Also named as defendants were the 
Danvers Teachers' Association, the collective bargaining representative of the Danvers 
school teachers, two representatives of the Massachusetts Teachers' Association, and the 
Department of Labor and Industries Board of Conciliation and Arbitration of the Com-
monwealth. The board did not participate in the proceedings. ld. at 415 n. 1, 360 N.E.2d 
at 877 n.l. 
2 Two companion cases decided the same day were Dennis- Yarmouth Regional School 
Comm. v. Dennis Teachers' Ass'n, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 425, 360 N.E.2d 883, and School 
Comm. of West Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater Teachers' Ass'n, 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 
434, 360 N .E.2d 886. Other defendants in Dennis-Yarmouth were the regional teachers' 
association and certain officers, individually and as representatives of their members and 
the regional director of the Boston office of the American Arbitration Association (action 
dismissed against regional director and not challenged on appeal). 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 428 n. 2, 360 N.E.2d at 883 n.2. Other defendants in West Bridgewater were certain 
officers of the association and the teacher, Patricia Mayer, 'whose grievance was the 
subject of the proceeding. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 434 n.1, 360 N.E.2d at 886 n.l. 
N.E.2d at 886 n.l. 
s 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 416, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
• I d. The procedures included notice to the teacher and the right to reply in writing to 
any derogatory material placed in his or her file. The agreement further provided that the 
teacher was to be advised promptly and in detail of any complaints against him or her 
made to the school administration or to the committee. ld. 
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year of nontenured status when she received notification from the Com-
mittee that she would not be rehired! 
Following the teacher's notification the association, on behalf of the 
teacher, filed a grievance that the Committee failed to follow the evalua-
tion procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. • Subse-
quently the association requested arbitration of the grievance.7 Before 
arbitration began, however, the Committee filed a complaint in superior 
court seeking a stay of the arbitration proceeding. 8 The Committee con-
tended that arbitration was barred by section 41 of chapter 71 of the 
General Laws. 1 In so contending the Committee pointed to prior case 
law interpreting section 41 as granting the Committee nondelegable 
authority over the decision to renew the teacher's contract.•• The supe-
rior court entered an order staying arbitration on the basis that "the 
claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by 
the provision for arbitration."11 
The Supreme Judicial Court, on its own initiative, transferred the 
case there for decision, 12 vacated the order of the superior court staying 
arbitration and HELD: A nontenured teacher's grievance alleging a 
1 Tyman was in her third year of nontenured status.Id. at 416-17, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
G.L. c. 71, I 41 provides that the school committee, in re-electing a teacher who haa 
served for the three previous consecutive years, shall employ the teacher to serve at its 
discretion (tenure). It further requires that a teacher not given tenure must be notified 
by April 15 or that teacher will be deemed appointed and thus tenured. 
1 The grievance filed in May alleged failure to follow appropriate evaluation procedures, 
inadequate claaaroom observation and evaluations, and discrimination. 1977 Maaa. Adv. 
Sh. at 417, 360 N. E. 2d at 878. 
7 Tyman waa notified on April12 and filed her grievance in May. Her grievance alleged 
seven different viola tiona of the agreement including a letter written by the Chairman of 
the English Department to the Assistant Superintendent of Schools making several derog-
atory remarks concerning Mrs. Tyman's ability aa an English teacher. See Brieffor Appel-
lant to the Appeals Court at 7. It should be noted that the defendants did not seek 
explicitly to arbitrate the school committee's decision not to reappoint Tyman to a fourth 
year. 1977 Maaa. Adv. Sh. at 417, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
• ld. at 417, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
1 G.L. c. 71, § 41 provides: 
Every school committee, in electing a teacher or superintendent, who has served 
in its public schools for the three previous consecutive school years, other than a 
union superintendent and the superintendent of schools in the city of Boston, shall 
employ him to serve at its discretion; but any school committee may elect a teacher 
who haa served in its schools for not leas than one school year to serve at such 
discretion. A teacher or superintendent not serving at discretion shall be notified 
in writing on or before April fifteenth whenever such person is not to be employed 
for the following school year. Unless said notice is given as herein provided, a 
teacher or superintendent not serving at discretion shall be deemed to be appointed 
for the following school year. 
11 See Brief for Appellees, School Committee of Danvers, at 17-18. 
11 1977 Maaa. Adv. Sh. at 417, 360 N.E.2d at 878. 
II Id. 
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school committee's failure to follow evaluation procedures set forth in a 
bargaining agreement is arbitrable notwithstanding the requirements of 
section 41, since the arbitration of such a grievance would not infringe 
upon the school committee's nondelegable authority to make decisions 
concerning tenure.t3 However, the Court also indicated that deference 
to the school committee's nondelegable authority sets limits on the rem-
edies which the arbitrator may grant; in particular, while the arbitrator 
can fashion a remedy short of tenure, he cannot award tenure itself.•~ 
The fundamental issue, as defined by the Court, arose from the ten-
sion between the lawfully authorized collective bargaining agreement 
and the traditional authority of the school committee to make tenure 
decisions. 15 More specifically the Court noted that on one hand, chapter 
150E constitutes a full authorization to school committees to agree to 
arbitrate issues arising out of a contractual grievance procedure and sets 
no limits on the particular issues which may be the subject of arbitra-
tion; on the other hand, school committees have traditionally had the 
full and nondelegable authority to determine at their discretion whether 
to award tenure or to renew a nontenured teacher's contract.•• Moreover, 
the Court noted that while the legislature has expressly provided that 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement override the provisions 
of certain of the general laws concerning public personnel, 17 the legisla-
13 Id. at 424, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
1' Id. at 424-25, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
1• The conflict arises between G.L. c. 150E, § 8, which provides that the parties may 
voluntarily include a grievance procedure culminating in final and. binding arbitration, 
and the traditional authority of the school committee under G.L. c. 71, § 41, which 
provides that the school committee will have discretion in making tenure decisions. 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 418, 360 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 418-19, 360 N.E.2d at 878-79. 
17 The legislature has resolved the conflict in several other instances in§ 7(d) of chapter 
150E which provides: "If a collective bargaining agreement reached by the employer and 
the exclusive representative contains a conflict between matters which are within the 
scope of negotiations pursuant to Section 6 of this Chapter and any municipal personnel 
ordinance, by Jaw, rule or regulation, ... the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
shall prevail." Personnel ordinances over which the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement prevail are those pursuant to the following general laws: the regulations of a 
police chief pursuant to section ninety-seven A of chapter forty-one; the regulations of a 
fire chief or other head of a fire department pursuant to chapter forty-eight; any of the 
following statutory provisions or rules or regulations made thereunder: 
(a) the second paragraph of section twenty-eight of chapter seven; 
(a V2) section six E of chapter twenty-one; 
(b) sections fifty to· fifty-six, inclusive, of chapter thirty-five; 
(c) section twenty-four A, paragraphs (4) and (5) of section forty-five, paragraphs 
(1), (4) and (10) of section forty-six, section forty-nine, as it applies to allocation 
appeals, and section fifty-three of chapter thirty; 
(d) sections twenty-one A and twenty-one B of chapter forty; 
(e) sections one hundred and eight D to one hundred and eight I, inclusive, and 
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ture has not provided that the terms of agreement override section 41 
of chapter 71, the source of the school committee's nondelegable author-
ity in the personnel area. Therefore, the Court indicated that its task 
was to assess the legislature's overall intention in light of both the full 
authorization to school committees to agree to arbitration and the con-
tinuing statutory discretion of the school committee to decide whether 
a nontenured teacher is to be reappointed. 18 
In its assessment of legislative intent, the Court declined to infer from 
legislative authorization to bargain collectively an intent to permit a 
school committee to bargain away its nondelegable authority to make 
tenure decisions.•• At the same time, however, the Court determined 
that if a school committee agrees to follow evaluation procedures pre-
cedent to making a tenure or renewal decision, a grievance alleging a 
violation of those procedures will be arbitrable. 20 In so determining, the 
Court reasoned that while the arbitration of the tenure decision would 
sections one hundred and eleven to one hundred and eleven I, inclusive, of chapter 
forty-one; 
(f) section thirty-three A of chapter forty-four; 
(g) sections fifty-seven to flfty-nine, inclusive, of chapter forty-eight; 
(glf2) section sixty-two of chapter ninety-two; 
(h) sections fourteen to seventeen E, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-
seven; 
(i) sections thirty to forty-two, inclusive, of chapter one hundred and forty-nine; 
(j) section fifty-three C of chapter two hundred and sixty-two. 
G.L.c. 150 E, § 7. 
11 1977 M&BB. Adv. Sh. at 418-19, 360 N.E.2d at 878-79. The ad hoc method of dealing 
with the statutory conflict became apparent in the absence of legislation after three cases 
decided in the 1976 Survey year. See Grunebaum, Labor Law, 1976 ANN. Suav. MASS. 
LAw § 6.4, at 166-69. See also Boston Teachers Union, Local66 v. School Committee of 
Boston, 1976 M&BB. Adv. Sh. at 1515, 350 N.E.2d at 707. 
11 The Court stated: "We do not fmd in legislative authorization for school teachers to 
bargain collectively concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment (G.L. c. 150E, § 2, inserted by Acts of 1973, c. 1078, §2), and to arbitrate grievances 
(G.L. c. 150 E, § 8), an intent to permit a school committee to bargain away its traditional 
authority to make tenure decisions if it ao wishes." 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 423, 360 N .E.2d 
at 881. 
• In a footnote, the Court noted that while the tenure decision itself may not be subject 
to contractual agreement and thus arbitration, the committee may, as a matter of educa-
tional policy, submit a particular tenure decision to arbitration. Footnote 5 states: 
We recognize that, if, as a matter of educational policy, a school committee 
wishes to submit a particular tenure question to arbitration and to accept the 
result of the arbitration, it may do 10 as part of its prerogative. Such an arbitration 
proceeding and award would not be inconsistent with the school committee's educa-
tional policy and, indeed, might be consistent with it. Teachers Local66 v. School 
Comm. of Boston,_ MaBB. _, (1976) (MaSB. Adv. Sh. [1976] 1515, 1527-1528. 
In this case, however, the incumbent achool committee has indicated an unwilling-
neSB to accept any decision of the arbitrator granting tenure. 
I d. at 423 n.5, 360 N .E.2d 881 n.5. 
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violate section 41 and thus be given no effect, arbitration of grievances 
concerning evaluation procedures would not violate that section. 21 In 
thus giving effect to agreements to arbitrate grievances concerning eval-
uation procedures, the Court expressly reaffirmed the Commonwealth's 
policies in favor of public sector arbitration.22 Accordingly, the Court 
effectively advised school committees that if they wish to except griev-
ances concerning evaluation procedures from a general grievance arbi-
tration clause in a bargaining agreement, they may not do so by implica-
tion in reliance upon the nondelegation principles of section 41. Rather, 
the agreement itself must expressly state such an exception.23 
While the decision in Danvers turned narrowly upon the Court's de-
termination as to scope of arbitration in teacher tenure disputes, and 
did not directly concern the issue of appropriate arbitral remedies, 24 the 
Court in dicta nevertheless defined generally the scope of remedies 
which the arbitrator may permissibly grant upon determining that con-
tractual evaluation procedures have been violated.25 In particular, as a 
corollary of its determination that tenure decisions are not arbitrable, 
the Court indicated that the arbitrator may not interfere with the school 
committee's nondelegable authority by granting tenure as a remedy for 
violations of evaluation procedures.28 However, while it concluded that 
z• Id. at 424, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
22 In affirming the Commonwealth's policy favoring arbitration the Court applied the 
federal presumption favoring arbitration indicating that unless there are positive assur-
ances that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the dis-
pute, or unless there is no lawful relief conceivable arbitration should not be denied. ld., 
citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
582-583 (1960); G. L. c. 150C, § 2(b). 
It is interesting to note that the New York Court of Appeals recently rejected the federal 
standard favoring arbitration in public sector disputes. In applying the Taylor Law, in the 
future the Court will not infer coverage by the arbitration clause absent clearly manifested 
intent but will employ a two-level analysis first determining whether arbitration of the 
subject is authorized by the Taylor Law and if so whether the parties clearly and unequi-
vocally agreed to arbitrate the dispute. Acting Superintendent v. United Liverpool Fac-
ulty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 369 N.E.2d 752 (1977). 
23 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 425-26, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
,. The issue in Danvers was whether the superior court was correct in staying arbitration 
of the grievance concerning teacher evaluation procedures. Thus, the Court indicated that 
it would be premature to announce any limit on the scope of an arbitrator's award pro-
vided it does not award tenure. ld. 
21 The Court appears to adopt the position of the New York Court of Appeals in Board 
of Education, Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School Dist., Nassau Co. v. Bellmore-Merrick 
United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167,383 N.Y.S.2d 242,347 N.E.2d 603 (1976) 
that temporary reinstatement is a permissible remedy. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 420, 360 
N.E.2d at 879-880. 
21 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 425, 360 N.E.2d at 881. In upholding the arbitrability of 
contractual evaluation procedures which do not impinge on the school committee's au-
thority to make the ultimate tenure decision, the Court strongly implied that where the 
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the arbitrator may not grant tenure, the Court intimated that tempo-
rary reinstatement for the purpose of re-evaluation could constitute an 
appropriate remedy.27 
Having indicated generally its view of the scope of arbitration of al-
leged procedural violations, the Court stated that it would be premature 
to announce any further limits on the scope of arbitral awards.2s Never-
theless, the Court noted by way of dicta that not all procedural viola-
tions will be sufficiently serious to warrant relief. 2v Moreover, the Court 
left open the validity of arbitral relief where there is no showing of a 
casual connection between the committee's failure to follow procedures 
and the decision not to re-employ.30 
Dennis- Yarmouth Regional School Committee v. Dennis Teachers 
Association31 was decided the same day as Danvers and involved a simi-
lar set of facts. The teacher Mary Malloy was in her third year when 
she was informed by the Committee that she would not be reappointed.32 
Since the teacher was in her third year, her reappointment would have 
resulted in tenure under section 41 of chapter 71 of the General Laws.33 
The teacher filed a grievance alleging that the school committee had 
violated certain portions of the collective bargaining agreement includ-
ing evaluation procedures, 34 more particularly a provision regarding 
teacher files. 35 In her grievance the teacher claimed that she was entitled 
to renewal of the contract as well as back pay. 36 Subsequently the 
teacher and the association sought arbitration of the grievance. 37 
arbitrator finds a violation of evaluation procedures he may award a remedy short of 
granting tenure. Id. 
27 See id. at 425-26, 360 N.E.2d at 882, citing West Bridgewater, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
434, 439-41, 360 N.E.2d 886, 889, discussed at text notes 45-66 infra. 
20 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 425, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
21 The Court noted that some violations of evaluation procedures may be too trivial to 
justify any relief and cautioned that other violations of teachers' rights may not justify 
reinstatement. ld. at 425, 360 N.E.2d at 881-882. 
30 Id. at 426, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883. 
32 Malloy had been appointed to serve for the school year 1971-1972 and her contract 
had been renewed for the two succeeding school years when she was informed on April 
11, 1974 that she would not be reappointed for the 1974-1975 school year. ld. at 429-30, 
360 N.E.2d at 884. 
33 /d. at 430, 360 N.E.2d at 884. 
"Id. 
•• See id. at 430 n.3, 360 N.E.2d at 884 n.3 indicating that "Article Ill of the agreement 
describes circumstances in which teacher files are to be maintained, giving a teacher 
notice of the filing of derogatory material and the right to respond." Article III F of the 
agreement set forth procedures for evaluating teacher performance. 
" Id. at 430, 360 N.E.2d at 884. 
27 /d. at 429-30, 360 N.E.2d at 884. The teachers' association argued that nonrenewal 
of a nontenured teacher was a subject for arbitration under the contract. Id. at 429, 360 
N.E.2d at 884. 
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The school committee and the association stipulated the issue to be 
arbitrated as the merits of the committee's decision not to renew Miss 
Malloy's contract.38 Consequently, the arbitrator passed only on the 
arbitrability of the non-renewal decision under the agreement, giving no 
consideration to the issue of the committee's alleged violation of evalua-
tion procedures.3' Following the arbitrator's decision that renewal was 
arbitrable under the contract, the committee sought and obtained from 
the superior court vacation of the award and a stay of further arbitra-
tion.•• 
Citing its decision in Danvers, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
superior court's judgment vacating the arbirtator's decision!• However, 
the Court modified the order staying arbitration and entered judgment 
ordering arbitration of the grievances regarding teacher files and evalua-
tion procedures. 42 In so doing the Court, consistent with Danvers, 
HELD: The merits of a tenure decision are not arbitrable, but griev-
ances alleging violations of evaluation procedures may be arbitrated. 43 
Accordingly, in Dennis- Yarmouth the Court indicated that grievants 
seeking arbitration of disputes regarding tenure will not obtain such 
arbitration if they stipulate the issue solely in terms of the merits of the 
tenure decision. 44 
In School Committee of West Bridgewater v. West Bridgewater 
Teachers' Association, 45 unlike in Danvers•• or Dennis-Yarmouth, 47 arbi-
tration had been concluded when the case reached the superior court.4K 
The arbitrator had determined that the school committee had failed to 
follow certain teacher evaluation procedures in violation of the collective 
11 ld. at 430, 360 N.E.2d at 884 ("Is the dispute the Association seeks to arbitrate on 
the merits, which involves the non-renewal of Miss Malloy, a non-tenured teacher, a 
grievance, and if so, is it arbitrable?"). 
• Id. at 430-31, 360 N.E.2d at 884. 
• Id. at 431, 360 N.E.2d at 885. 
•• ld. at 431-32, 360 N.E.2d at 885. The Supreme Judicial Court did so despite argu-
ments from the teachers' association that judicial relief was premature and that arbitra-
tion should be concluded on the merits before consideration in superior court. In rejecting 
the aasociation's arguments the Court noted that G.L. c. 150C, § 2(b) authorizes the 
auperior court to stay arbitration if the court finds "(2) that the claim sought to be 
arbitrated does not state a controversy covered by the provision for arbitration." ld. Thus, 
the Court concluded that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute which cannot lawfully be 
the subject of arbitration (i.e. the tenure decision) was tantamount to the absence of a 
controversy, therefore bringing it within the purview of G.L. c. 150C, § 2 (b) authorizing 
a stay by the superior court. ld . 
., ld. at 432-33, 360 N.E.2d at 884-85 . 
..., Id. 
•• Id. at 432, 360 N.E.2d at 885. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 434, 360 N.E.2d 886. 
a 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 360 N.E.2d 877. See text at notes 1-30 supra. 
n 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 428, 360 N.E.2d 883. See text at notes 31-44 supra. 
• I d. at 434, 360 N .E.2d at 887. 
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bargaining agreement.41 Having made this determination, the arbitrator 
had ordered the teacher reinstated immediately with full pay, 50 and the 
teacher was reinstated in accordance with the arbitrator's order. The 
school committee, however, brought an action in superior court seeking 
an order vacating the arbitrator's award.51 The superior court granted 
such order on the grounds that the schoof committee's decision not to 
renew the contract of the nontenured teacher was not arbitrable and, 
that even if its decision were arbitrable, reinstatement would not be a 
permissible form of relief. 62 
The Supreme Judicial Court on direct appellate review vacated the 
superior court's order,63 affirmed the arbitrator's award and HELD: An 
arbitrator may award a remedy of compensation for all or part of the 
subsequent school year upon determining that the school committee's 
failure to adhere to contractual evaluation procedures resulted in nonre-
newal of the teacher's contract.64 Moreover, after noting that the com-
mittee's reinstatement of the teacher had mooted the issue as to the case 
at hand, the Court nevertheless concluded by way of dicta that tempo-
rary reinstatement is an acceptable arbitral remedy for a nonsupervisory 
teacher who has been treated unfairly by a committee's failure to follow 
evaluation procedures in its decision not to renew the teacher's con-
tract." 
In analyzing the permissibility of the compensation remedy, the 
Court stated that where a failure to follow evaluation procedures results 
in harm to the teacher, an arbitrator clearly may make an award of 
compensation.61 The Court indicated that such a compensation award 
is permissible even if it is determined that the arbitrator has no author-
41 ld. at 436-37, 360 N.E.2d at 887-88. The collective bargaining agreement provided 
that all observations of teacher performance were to be conducted openly and with full 
knowledge of the teacher. Written reports of performance were to be given to the teacher 
and discussed with her. The teacher was also entitled to file an answer in writing to any 
complaint. The arbitrator found, however, that Mayer was not advised of classroom obser-
vation, nor was she advised of a prior recommendation not to reemploy her made to the 
school committee before a March 1975 evaluation meeting at which she was shown only 
favorable evaluations. Moreover, she was not advised of this recommendation until after 
the committee had voted on it. Accordingly the arbitrator reasoned that this latter circum-
stance made it impossible for Mayer (1) to answer certain arguably unwarranted conclu-
sions on which the recommendations not to renew were based, (2) to make corrections in 
her performance and (3) to disclose to the school committee the absence of opportunity 
to rebut complaints against her. ld. at 436-37, 360 N.E.2d at 887-88. 
11 ld. at 437, 360 N.E.2d at 888. Full pay was deemed to include seniority and other 
benefits less any interim earnings from other employment. ld. 
•• ld. at 434-35, 360 N.E.2d at 887. 
" I d. at 435, 360 N .E.2d, at 887. 
IS fd. 
•• I d. at 439, 360 N .E.2d at 888 . 
.. ld. at 440-41, 360 N.E.2d at 889. 
" ld. at 439, 360 N.E.2d at 888. 
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ity to order reinstatement. 57 Moreover, the Court noted that the expira-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement would not affect the permissi-
bility of such a remedy.58 
Turning to the permissibility of reinstatement as an arbitral remedy, 
the Court focused upon section ll(a)(5) of chapter 150C of the General 
Laws, which provides the standard for vacating or confirming arbitral 
awards. Particularly, the Court noted that section ll(a)(5) provides in 
part that " 'the fact that the arbitrator's award orders reinstatement of 
an employee with or without back pay or grants relief . . . ' that a court 
could or would not grant 'shall not be ground for vacating or refusing to 
confirm the award'."58 Thus, the Court reasoned that section 11 recog-
nized reinstatement as an acceptable result of arbitration, although 
under standard principles of contract law and of equitable remedies 
such a result would not or might not be ordered.60 Having thus found 
reinstatement awardable as a matter of general arbitration principles, 
the Court considered, in light of Danvers, whether temporary reinstate-
ment would nonetheless be impermissible as infringing upon the school 
committee's nondelegable prerogatives. Reasserting its determination 
that an arbitrator cannot order tenure itself, the Court nevertheless 
recognized temporary reinstatement as an acceptable result of arbitra-
tion!• In particular, the Court reasoned that in awarding temporary 
reinstatement the arbitrator still leaves in the hands of the committee 
the ultimate determination as to whether to grant the employee tenure.62 
The Court concluded that the temporary reinstatement of a nonsupervi-
sory teacher harmed by a breakdown in required teacher evaluation 
procedures does not constitute an infringement upon committee prerog-
atives!3 Moreover, the Court determined that its result, the allowance 
of reinstatement in addition to back pay as arbitral remedies, would 
tend to effectuate rational decisionmaking in that it would give effect 
to agreed-upon evaluation procedures. In particular, the Court cited 
various policy benefits which it found inherent in contractual proce-
57 ld. See School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 404, 343 
N.E.2d 145, 149 . 
.. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 439, 360 N.E.2d at 889. The Court noted that a contrary result 
would bar relief where the violation ocurred in the last year of the agreement . 
.. Id. at 440, 360 N.E.2d at 889 . 
.. ld. 
11 Id. at 441, 360 N.E.2d at 889. The Court also indicated that an arbitral remedy which 
allows the school committee to choose between a year's salary or reinstatement would be 
permissible. Id. at 440, 360 N .E.2d at 889. 
'
2 Id. at 441, 360 N.E.2d at 889. 
13 I d. citing Board of Education, Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School Dist., Nassau Co. 
v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 
242, 245-46, 347 N.E.2d 603, 607 (1976) (holding that temporary reinstatement for the 
purposes of reevaluation is a permissible remedy). 
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dures for teacher evaluation. u 
Having indicated that temporary reinstatement and compensation 
are permissible arbitral remedies, the Court nevertheless issued two 
caveats to arbitrators. First, the Court advised arbitrators that they 
should "not award reinstatement of a teacher whose presence, on sub-
stantial grounds, would be inappropriate."15 Second, the Court recog-
nized that cases may exist in which an award of reinstatement would 
be vacated as violative of "some fundamental principle concerning man-
agement of a school system and a school committee's right to decide who 
should teach in its system. "•• 
The significance of the Trilogy decision lies in its determination that 
the nondelegation principles limit the scope of arbitration only so as to 
prohibit arbitration of the tenure decision itself; and that accordingly 
the arbitration of contractual evaluation procedures precedent to the 
tenure or renewal decision is not forbidden by nondelegation principles. 
Earlier Massachusetts cases had indicated that certain school commit-
tee decisions would not be arbitrable to the extent that these decisions 
infringed on the nondelegable authority of a school committeeY How-
ever, before the Trilogy the extent to which contractual teacher evalua-
tion procedures would be arbitrable remained unclear. By upholding the 
arbitrability of teacher evaluation procedures the Trilogy effectuates 
within the educational personnel area the Commonwealth's statutory 
policy favoring grievance arbitration in the public sector.68 Importantly, 
in the Trilogy, the Court has provided much needed guidance to the 
superior courts as to the circumstances under which arbitration should 
be stayed under subsection ll(a)(3) or vacated under subsection ll(c) 
of chapter 150C of the General Laws. Additionally, the Trilogy has 
advised arbitrators as to the remedies which are permissible when a 
violation of contractual teacher evaluation procedures is found. Signifi-
cantly, the Court specifically sanctioned the remedies of compensation 
and temporary reinstatement. Moreover, in light of the Court's reason-
ing in West Bridgewater it may be possible that other remedies subse-
quently will be deemed acceptable provided that they do not infringe 
upon the school committee's authority to make tenure decisions.•u 
" ld. at 437, 360 N.E.2d at 888. See note 168 infra for a listing of those benefits. 
11 ld. at 441, 360 N.E.2d at 890. 
11 ld. at 441-42, 360 N.E.2d at 890. 
17 See text at notes 91-114 infra. 
11 See G.L. c. 150E, § 8. See also Note, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: 
The New Massachusetts Law, 9 SurroLK U. L. REv. 721, 728 (1975). 
11 For example, where faculty have negotiated evaluation procedures designed to benefit 
teachers by providing feedback and opportunity to improve, an arbitrator might include 
in-service training as part of the reinstatement remedy. Such a remedy would not appear 
to infringe upon any nondelegable duty of a school committee. 
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After a brief introduction to grievance arbitration in the public sector, 
this comment will examine the sources and policies underlying the non-
delegation principle as applied in Massachusetts case law prior to the 
Court's holdings in the Trilogy. Then the comment will discuss gener-
ally the conflict which arises where the legislature has failed to give any 
indication of the relationship between the nondelegable authority of 
school committees under the education laws and the authorization to 
arbitrate and bargain under state collective bargaining enabling acts. 
Turning to an analysis of this conflict in the tenure context, the com-
ment will first review how the conflict has been resolved by courts in 
other jurisdictions. Having considered approaches of several jurisdic-
tions to the problem of accomodating the nondelegable nature of tenure 
decisions with the statutory authorization to bargain collectively and to 
arbitrate, the comment will turn to the Trilogy and analyze its reason-
ing. Specifically, the comment will conclude that the accomodation 
reached in the Trilogy represents a sound compromise in that it gives 
effect to teacher's rights to bargain and to arbitrate without vitiating the 
traditional nondelegable authority of school committees to make tenure 
decisions. Having examined the accomodation reached in the Trilogy as 
to the issue of the arbitrability of grievances concerning tenure decisions 
and teacher evaluation procedures, the comment will focus upon the 
Trilogy's approach to the issue of arbitral remedies. While noting that 
the reinstatement remedy sanctioned in the Trilogy will often be im-
practicable, the comment will also suggest that the narrow limitation 
on arbitral remedies implicit in the Trilogy would appear to allow arbi-
trators broad scope in fashioning remedies supplemental to or in lieu of 
temporary reinstatement. Finally, the comment will discuss the indica-
tions in the Trilogy that the scope of arbitration of arbitral remedies 
may be limited in certain circumstances by factors unrelated to nonde-
legation principles. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ELEMENTS oF THE AccoMMODATION STRucK IN THE 
Trilogy: GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION AND THE NONDELEGATION PRINCIPLE 
A. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN MASSACHUSETTS 
In 1965 the legislature granted public employees the rights of unioni-
zation and collective bargaining, rights previously accorded only to pri-
vate employees.70 However, the 1965 legislation did not provide public 
71 Acts of 1965, c. 763. This act applied to all county, city, town or district employees, 
except elected officers, board and commission members, executive officers and police. I d. 
at c. 763, § 2, amending G.L. c. 149 by inserting § 178G. 
While public employees had the right to form unions and present proposals with respect 
48
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/19
382 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.6 
employees with either the right to strike or the right to binding arbitra-
tion of labor disputes.71 Public employee organizations pressed for legis-
lation instituting such rights in the public sector, contending that with-
out the right to strike or to arbitrate, public employees would be power-
less to effectuate their newly created rights of unionization and collec-
tive bargaining. 72 Responding to strong public employee pressure the 
legislature in 1973 enacted chapter 150E providing for binding arbitra-
tion in the public sector.73 The arbitration provided for in chapter 150E 
is of two kinds; impasse arbitration and grievance arbitration. Impasse 
arbitration is the arbitration of disputes arising out of the collective 
bargaining process. 74 Grievance arbitration, in contrast, is the arbitra-
tion of disputes which arise over the meaning and application of terms 
within the collective bargaining agreement. Grievance arbitration is 
provided for in section 875 and impasse arbitration in section 9 of chapter 
150E.78 
A legislative policy broadly favoring arbitration in general, and griev-
ance arbitration in particular, appears to underlie the statutory provi-
sions. Thus section 8 not only broadly authorizes public employers to 
enter into agreements to arbitrate grievances, but also authorizes the 
Labor Relations Commission to order arbitration of grievances in certain 
to salaries and conditions of employment as early as 1958, Acts of 1958, c. 460, they 
remained dependent on legislation for increases and wages until 1965. See Segal, Labor 
Law: Municipal Bargaining, 1971 ANN. Suav. MASs. LAW § 6.2, at 99. 
11 Acts of 1965, c. 763. See Sherry, Labor Law, 1974 ANN. Suav. MASs. LAw § 2.12, 
at 25. 
72 Additionally, several other important policy considerations militated in support of 
the employees' position favoring arbitration. For instance, grievance arbitration acts as a 
device to balance the power between public employers and employees. In the absence of 
the right to strike the balance is tilted in favor of the public employer. Furthermore, 
grievance arbitration can serve to identify for public managers and officials problem areas 
to be resolved in future negotiations. Finally, grievance arbitration can serve as a much 
needed release valve for employee frustration. See generally DeWolf, The Enforcement of 
the Labor Arbitration Agreement in the Public Sector, 39 ALB. L. REv. 393, 395 (1975). 
73 Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 2 (codified at G.L. c. 150E). See Sherry, Labor Law, 1974 
ANN. SuRv. MASs. LAw § 2.12, at 25, 31. 
u G.L. c. 150E § 9. 
71 G.L. c. 150E § 8. During the last Survey year the constitutionality of binding arbitra-
tion was upheld in Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2035, 352 N.E. 2d 914. One significant aspect of Town of Arlington was whether 
a, town could delegate to an arbitrator the power to resolve a dispute that would affect 
the tax rate and thus be in violation of the Home Rule Amendment. In upholding the 
arbitration statute against constitutional challenge the Court indicated that the arbitra-
tion statute was not constitutionally forbidden where proper safeguards and standards for 
the delegation were provided. Id. at 2045-46, 352 N.E.2d at 920. See also Student 
Comment, Labor Law: Public Employee Impasse Procedures, 1976 ANN. Suav. MAss. LAw 
§ 6.10, at 194. 
7
' G.L. c. 150E, § 9. 
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instances where the parties have not so provided it in their agreement.77 
Moreover, section 1 of chapter 150C provides that a collective bargain-
ing agreement between a labor organization and an employer to submit 
grievances to arbitration "shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable."7x 
Finally, the legislative provisions which provide that collective bargain-
ing agreements override other laws concerning personnel policy, 70 when 
viewed in conjunction with other provisions of chapter 150E, imply a 
strong policy favoring grievance arbitration. 
While the statutory provisions thus embody a policy favoring broad 
rights for public employees and employers to agree to arbitrate griev-
ances, 80 the legislature left open the possibility that in certain instances 
other public policies or laws may require limitations on such rights.x• In 
particular, in the area of public education, the legislature left it to the 
Court to determine the extent to which the right to arbitrate school 
committee personnel decisions may be limited by the traditionally ac-
cepted principle that school committees have nondelegable authority to 
make such decisions. 82 
77 G.L. c. 150E, § 8 provides that the parties may elect to include in their bargaining 
agreement a written grievance procedure culminating in final' and binding arbitration. 
Furthermore, the Commission may order arbitration at the request of either party. 
78 G.L. c. 150E, § 1. 
71 G.L. c. 150E, § 7(d). See note 17 supra. 
81 See Note, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: The New Massachusetts Law, 
9 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 721, 728 (1975). 
81 In Boston Teachers Union, Local66 v. School Comm. of Boston, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1515, 350 N.E.2d 707, the Court recognized the existence of a statutory conflict between 
authorization to arbitrate and the nondelegation principle implicit in the education laws. 
The Court there held that an agreement to hire substitute teachers was arbitrable. ld. at 
1527, 350 N.E.2d at 714. Then the Court discussed more generally the role of the legisla-
ture in resolving the statutory conflict: 
The Legislature can remove conside~able uncertainty concerning which subjects are 
proper matters for collective bargaining between teachers and school committees. 
It might define those subjects which can or cannot be incorporated in a binding 
collective bargaining agreement. It might state that, to the extent certain matters 
are made part of a collective bargaining agreement, the school committee has lost 
its prerogative during the term of the bargaining agreement to exercise its otherwise 
exclusive control over matters of educational policy, except perhaps in certain 
circumstances. In the absence of further statutory definition the subject of the scope 
of permissible, binding collective bargaining and the enforceability of such agree-
ments will have to be dealt with on a case by case basis. 
ld. at 1527-28 n.5, 350 N.E.2d at 714 n.5. See also Danvers, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 423 
n.5, 360 N .E.2d at 881 n.5, citing Boston Teachers Union, Local 66. 
82 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 418-19, 422, 360 N.E.2d at 78-79, 80. 
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B. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE N ONDELEGABILITY OF SCHOOL COMMITTEE PER-
SONNEL DECISIONS 
Massachusetts courts in delimiting the powers of school committees 
have been guided by the principle that school committee personnel 
decisions may not be delegated to third parties.83 Unlike the once fa-
vored federal "nondelegation" doctrine, the principle that school com-
mittee personnel decisions84 are nondelegable does not appear to rest 
upon constitutional foundations. Rather, that principle has its source in 
the Massachusetts courts' interpretation of the state's education laws as 
broadly committing matters of local educational personnel policy to the 
local school committees. 88 This broad interpretation of the education 
laws, in particular of section 42A of chapter 71, was evident in Demers 
v. School Committee of Worcester, 81 in which the Court held that the 
authority to employ was vested solely in the school committee and could 
not be discharged by the superintendent.87 Similarly, in other cases the 
Court has indicated that an attempt to delegate the power to determine 
teacher salaries to the mayor or other city officials would be void, since 
the legislature has vested this power in the school committee. Kll 
As an important corollary to the Court's interpretation of the educa-
tion laws, the Court has generally interpreted statutes concerning labor 
relations in the public sector in a manner which would not impinge upon 
the nondelegable authority of school committees.81 In particular, the 
Court has indicated that, in the absence of express statutory language 
overriding school committee authority in the personnel or policy area, 
11 School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. 
See also text at notes 91-114 infra; DeCanio v. School Comm. of Boston, 358 Mass. 116, 
120, 260 N .. E.2d 677, 680 (1970), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Fenton v. 
School Comm. of Boston, 401 U.S. 929 (1971) (school committee had plenary power in 
discharge of probationary teacher; where legislature has limited the powers of the school 
committee it has done so explicitly); Sullivan v. School Comm. of Revere, 348 Mass. 162, 
165, 202 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1964) (school committee's supremacy under§ 37 could not be 
fettered by three year contract with superintendent); Murphy v. Cambridge, 342 Mau. 
339, 341, 173 N.E.2d 616, 618 (1961) (school committee not bound by vote of past com-
mittee creating and appointing academic personnel to new positions); Demers v. School 
Comm. of Worcester, 329 Mass. 370, 373, 108 N.E.2d 651,652 (1952) (authority to employ 
vested in the school committee not superintendent); O'Brien v. Pittsfield, 316 Mass. 283, 
285-86, 55 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1944) (power to determine salaries vested solely in the school 
committee cannot be delegated to superintendent) . 
.. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 2.01-2.02 (1958). 
" See cases cited in note 83 supra. 
" 329 Mau. 370, 108 N.E.2d 651 (1952). 
•• ld. at 373, 108 N.E.2d at 652. 
11 Leonard v. School Comm. of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 329-330, 135 N.E. at 459, 
461 (1922). 
01 See, eg. School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mau. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 
N.E.2d 145. 
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the Court will not infer from legislative acts an intent to override such 
authority.80 Such a judicial approach was clearly evident in pre-Trilogy 
cases in which the Court held that the recently enacted public sector 
collective bargaining and arbitration statutes were not intended to over-
ride the nondelegable authority of a school committee to abolish certain 
supervisory positions in its school system. 
Nondelegation as a Limitation on Arbitration in Pre-Trilogy Cases 
Since the passage of statutes providing for collective bargaining and 
arbitration in the public sector, the Supreme Judicial Court has reaf-
firmed the principle ofnondelegation.81 In particular, the Court has held 
that, despite the facial generality of the collective bargaining and arbi-
tration statutes, those statutes were not intended to override the non-
delegable authority of school committees.82 Thus, school committees 
may not, through collective bargaining in general or through agree-
ments to arbitrate grievances in particular, delegate their authority to 
make decisions concerning educational personnel or policy. 93 
The Court's reaffirmance of the nondelegation principle in the face of 
the passage of chapters 150C and 150E was illustrated by two decisions 
rendered during the previous Survey year.94 Both of those cases involved 
the issue of the arbitrability of a school committee's decision to abolish 
,. For cases outside the arbitration context in which the Court has refused to infer 
legislative intent to override the broad powers of the school committee see DeCanio v. 
School Committee of Boston, 358 Mass. 116, 120, 260 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1970) appeal 
dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Fenton v. School Committee of Boston, 401 U.S. 
929 (1971) (holding that a school committee may discharge a probationary teacher at any 
time); Dowd v. Dover, 334 Mass. 23, 26-27, 133 N.E.2d 501, 503-04 (1956) (holding that 
the issue of whether to maintain a town high school or send pupils on a tuition basis to a 
high school in another town is for school committee decision not voter referendum). 
" School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 325 N.E.2d 
283, aff'd 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144; School Comm. of Braintree v. Ray-
mond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145. See text at notes 107-114 infra. 
" See text at notes 91-114 infra discussing Hanover and Braintree. 
" See School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 477-78, 
325 N.E.2d 282, 286, aff'd 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144; and School Comm. 
of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 401, 343 N .E.2d at 148. In Danvers the 
Court followed Hanover and Braintree indicating that a school committee may not bar-
gain away its traditional authority to make tenure decisions. 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 423, 
360 N .E.2d at 881. See also footnote 5 where the Court indicates that while a school 
committee may not contractually delegate the tenure decision to an arbitrator it may as 
a matter of educational policy submit a particular tenure question to arbitration.Jd. See 
also text at note 20 supra. 
•• School Comm. of Hanover v. Curry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144, aff'g 
1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 325 N.E.2d 282; School Comm. of Braintree v. Ray-
mond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 343 N.E.2d 145, discussed in Grunebaum, Labor Law, 
1976 ANN. SURv. MAss. LAw. § 6.4, at 166. 
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unilaterally supervisory positions. In School Committee of Hanover v. 
Curry'5 the school committee had unilaterally abolished the position of 
supervisor of music effective after the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 98 The agreement provided for grievance arbitration. 97 
After the announcement of the abolition of the supervisor's position, the 
teachers' association sought grievance arbitration on behalf of the super-
visor, alleging that the school committee had violated the agreement by 
eliminating the position of supervisor of music.98 The arbitrator deter-
mined that the grievance was arbitrable and upheld the assocation's 
contentions that the school committe had violated the terms of the 
agreement by unilaterally abolishing the position.•• Accordingly, the 
arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated to the supervisory position 
with back pay.100 The school committee sought and obtained a superior 
court order vacating the award. 101 Mter the association appealed the 
superior court order, the Appeals Court held that abolition of the posi-
tion "was committed to the exclusive, nondelegable decision of the 
school committee ... "by section 37 of chapter 71 and therefore should 
not have been submitted to arbitration.102 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the award was a nullity, and vacated the award.103 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Appeals Court decision and 
held that a school committee's decision to eliminate a supervisory posi-
tion is not arbitrable. 104 In so holding the Court first reasoned that 
"[p]ublic policy, whether derived from, and whether explicit or im-
plicit in statute or decisional law, or, in neither, may ... restrict the 
freedom to arbitrate .... " 105 More particularly, the Court reasoned 
that there are legitimate areas of management prerogative over educa-
tional policy, although not statutorily prohibited, which cannot be bar-
gained away because of the necessity to safeguard public control over 
such decisions. 108 
•• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144. 
" ld. at 396, 343 N.E.2d at 144. 
17 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 468, 325 N.E.2d at 283, alf'd 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
396, 343 N.E.2d 144. 
•• ld. at 469 n.3, 325 N.E.2d at 284 n.3 . 
.. ld. 
1110 ld. 
Ill fd. 
102 ld. at 480-81, 325 N.E.2d at 287, aff'd, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d at 144. 
103 ld. at 481, 325 N.E.2d at 287. 
184 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 396, 397, 343 N.E.2d 144, 145. 
101 ld. at 398, 343 N.E.2d at 145, citing Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. 
Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-17, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429, 339 
N.E.2d 132, 133 (1975). 
188 ld. Language in the Appeals Court opinion was more explicit. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 480, 325 N.E.2d at 287. ·("There is a legitimate area of managerial prerogative over 
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The Court in Hanover emphasized that its holding should be read in 
conjunction with School Committee of Braintree v. Raymond, 107 a com-
panion case similar on its facts to Hanover. 108 In Braintree the school 
committee had abolished a supervisory position held by the grievant 
Raymond through its consolidation with another position. 10u The teach-
ers' association sought arbitration, contending that the decision violated 
a clause in the collective bargaining agreement. 110 The arbitrator con-
cluded that the grievance was arbitrable and the committee had vio-
lated the agreement by unilaterally abolishing the position. 111 Accord-
ingly, the arbitrator ordered the grievant reinstated with back pay .112 
Upon application of the school committee the superior court vacated the 
award and the association appealed. 113 The Supreme Judicial Court on 
direct appellate review held that the school committee exceeded its 
powers in binding itself not to abolish a supervisory position for a period 
extending beyond the school year notwithstanding the terms of the 
agreement. 114 
In Braintree and Hanover the Court thus established the proposition 
that the scope of the arbitrability of school committee personnel deci-
sions is limited by the nondelegability of such decisions. While those 
cases seemed clearly to imply the nonarbitrability of tenure decisions, 
the Court was not called upon expressly to consider whether tenure 
decisions were arbitrable. Another more difficult issue left open by 
Hanover and Braintree was whet~r, assuming that the actual decision 
whether or not to grant tenure is ot arbitrable, terms in an agreement 
mandating certain evaluation p ocedures may nevertheless be arbi-
trated where grievance arbitration is called for in the agreement. 
educational policy which is committed to the school committee and which it cannot bar-
gain away, as it could if it were a private party not subject to public control.") 
111 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 397, 343 N.E.2d at 145. 
1• It should be noted that the Court in Braintree discounted any difference between the 
Braintree and Hanover cases predicated on the fact that Hanover arose under the old 
collective bargaining statute (G.L. c. 149, §§ 178D, 178F, 178N, repealed by Acts of 1973, 
c. 1078, §§ 1, 2, adding G.L. c. 150E). 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 401, 343 N.E.2d 145, 147. 
111 Id. at 400, 343 N.E.2d at 147. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. at 400-01, 343 N.E.2d at 147. 
112 ld. 
ua Id. at 401, 343 N.E.2d at 147. 
11 ' Id. at 404, 343 N.E.2d at 148. At the same time the Court held that under a col-
lective bargaining agreement an arbitrator could award compensation where he could not 
award reinstatement. Id. at 405, 343 N.E.2d at 149. 
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II. ARBITRATION OF TENURE-RELATED GRIEVANCES 
A. APPROACHES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Prior to the enactment in Massachusetts and in other states of stat-
utes granting collective bargaining rights to public employees, state 
courts generally upheld the principle that school committees may not 
delegate their authority to make tenure decisions. 115 That principle, 
however, has been subjected to close analysis in some state courts since 
the enactment of public sector collective bargaining and arbitration 
statutes. 118 Closer analysis than theretofore had been accorded the 
nondelegation principle was seen as required because collective bar-
gaining provided a mechanism by which the school committee could 
"delegate" certain aspects of the tenure-granting process while retain-
ing its authority over other aspects thereof. 117 In particular, through 
collective bargaining school committees could agree ,to follow certain 
procedures in evaluating teachers for tenure purposes. 118 Thus, the 
question was raised as to whether, assuming the substance of tenure 
decisions may not be delegated, the school committee may nevertheless 
agree to follow certain evaluation procedures and to arbitrate grievances 
concerning such procedures. At the same time, a more general question 
persisted in Massachusetts and other states as to whether the collective 
bargaining and arbitration statutes were intended to override altogether 
the traditional tenure-granting authority of school systems. 
The courts of several states, prior to the Trilogy, considered the issues 
of whether public sector collective bargaining and arbitration statutes 
were intended to override the nondelegable authority of school commit-
111 See DeWolf, The Enforcement of the Labor Arbitration Agreement in the Public 
Sector, 39 ALB. L. REv. 393, 408 (1975). 
111 As a result of these enactments, public education employees have in many cases 
extended the protection afforded probationary employees through the negotiation of just 
cause provisions. The typical "boilerplate" just cause provision reads: "No teacher shall 
be disciplined, reprimanded, reduced in rank or compensation, or deprived of any profes-
sional advantage without just cause." Such provisions interpreted by arbitrators eliminate 
the authority of a school committee to dismiss without just cause the employment of a 
nontenured teacher at the end of his or her probationary period. See generally Note, Public 
Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of Fair Representation (herein-
after cited as Due Process) 89 HARv. L. REv. 752, 753 n.ll (1976) (indicating that as of 
September 1975 some 28 states permit the establishment of grievanc~s culminating in 
arbitration. See also id. at 757 n.28 surveying state courts' treatment of scope of arbitra-
tion on this issue. 
117 Id. at 753 n.ll, 757 n.28. 
118 This is true where the legislature has not by statute limited the scope of bargaining 
by prohibiting bargaining over certain subjects. For a list of jurisdictions limiting the 
scope of bargaining by statute see id. at 753 n.S. 
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tees over tenure systems; 118 and whether, assuming that those statutes 
were not so intended, bargaining and arbitration concerning evaluation 
procedures could be consistent with upholding the school committee's 
nondelegable authority over tenure decisions. 
The cases from other jurisdictions generally indicated three ap-
proaches taken by the courts where the legislature failed to indicate 
expressly whether statutorily authorized bargaining rights overrode the 
authority of school committees in the tenure area. 120 According to the 
first approach, the enactment of a comprehensive collective bargaining 
statute preempted or impliedly repealed prior legislation governing per-
sonnel decisions in the public sector. Under this approach, therefore, full 
effect should be given to a collective bargaining agreement even when 
it would appear to override the nondelegable prerogatives of school com-
mittees, such as the prerogatives to make decisions concerning tenure. 121 
At the other extreme, the second approach holds that the scope of arbi-
tration is strictly limited by statutory prohibitions governing public 
sector personnel relations and, therefore, no effect should be given to an 
agreement to arbitrate concerning any matters touching upon tenure 
decisions. The second approach would negate collective bargaining or 
arbitration concerning evaluation procedures as well as concerning the 
actual tenure decision. 122 The third approach represents an intermediate 
position which looks not only to specific prohibitions but to enactments 
and procedures as expressions of public policy, and attempts to harmo-
nize contractual rights with public law by giving effect to those provi-
sions of the agreement not repugnant to the public law.l23 This approach 
would give effect to agreements to arbitrate concerning violations of 
evaluation procedures. At the same time, it would not allow a school 
committee to commit the actual tenure decision itself to an arbitrator. 
111 See discussions of these cases in Danvers at 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 419-21, 360 
N .E.2d at 879-80, citing VanGorder v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough School Dist., 513 P.2d 
1094 (Alas. 1973); Illinois Educ. Ass'n Local Community High School Dist. 218 v. Board 
of Educ. of School Dist. 218, Cook Co., 62 Ill. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975); Wesclin Educ. 
Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Wesclin Community Unit School Dist., 30 Ill. App. 3d 67, 331 
N.E.2d 335 (1975); Trustees of Junior College Dist. No. 508, County of Cook v. Cook 
County College Teachers Union, Local1600, 62 Ill. 2d 470, 342 N.E.2d 473 (1976); Kaleva-
Norman-Dickson School Dist. No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson Teachers' Ass'n, 393 
Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975); Board of Educ. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High School 
Dist. Nassau Co. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 167, 
383 N.Y.S.2d 53,358 N.E.2d 878 (1976); Legislative Conference of the City Univ. v. Board 
of Higher Educ., 31 N.Y.2d 926, 340 N.Y.S.2d 924, 293 N.E.2d 92, aff'g 38 A.D.2d 478 
(App. Div. 1972). 
121 See Note, Due Process, supra note 104 at 753. See generally Sachman, Redefining 
the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C. L. REv. 155 (1977). 
••• See text at notes 124-129 infra. 
•zz See text at notes 130-133 infra. 
123 See text at notes 134-141 infra. 56
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The first approach, adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court, up-
holds the arbitrability not only of grievances pertaining to alleged vio-
lations of evaluation procedures, but also of grievances alleging the in-
correctness of the tenure decision itself. In Kaleva-Norman-Dickson 
School District No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Teacher's 
Association124 a probationary teacher sought to arbitrate the school com-
mittee's decision not to renew her contract on the grounds that nonre-
newal violated the just cause provision125 of the agreement, against 
claims by the school committee that arbitration was barred by the 
"function of management" reservation clause. 121 The Court, in finding 
the federal policy favoring arbitration127 appropriate under the state's 
public employment relations act, held the teacher's claim arbitrable. 128 
In so holding the Michigan court appeared to rely on earlier cases hold-
ing that because the arbitration agreement itself limits the authority of 
the arbitrator to deciding matters within the agreement, the employer, 
by accepting the contract, does not delegate its policy-making authority 
to the arbitrator. 121 
The second approach has been adopted by the Illinois courts, which 
have held that the scope of arbitration is limited by specific statutory 
prohibitions in the state's education laws. In Wesclin Education Asso-
ciation v. Wesclin Community Union School District, 130 two teachers 
sought to arbitrate the school board's failure to follow contractual evalu-
ation procedures precedent to a decision not to renew their contract. 131 
In holding that the school board could not impose upon itself conditions 
114 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975). 
111 Id. at 589-90, 227 N.W.2d at 501-503. The union and the teacher contended that the 
school board had violated a specific provision of the contract that a teacher would not be 
dismissed except for just cause, and that the violation was arbitrable by virtue of a broad 
arbitration clause providing that disputes over interpretation of the contract were arbitra-
ble. ld. 
111 The school committee contended that it had retained and reserved the powers, duties 
and responsibilities conferred upon it under Michigan laws to hire and dismiss em-
ployees by virtue of Art. ll. ld. at 590, 227 N.W.2d at 503. 
117 Id. at 591, 227 N.W.2d at 504 citing United Steelworkers of America v. American 
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (holding that a claim which on its face is governed by the 
contract is arbitrable). See also id. at 592, citing United Steelworkers of America v. 
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (holding that "[a]n order 
to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it can be said with 
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that 
covers the dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration"). 
111 Id. at 595, 227 N.W.2d at 506. 
111 See Local 953, Int'l Union of American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees v. School Dist. of Benton Harbor, 56 LC, 51,775 (Mich. 1967) referred to in 
Fishback, Grievance Arbitration in Public Employee Disciplinary Cases, 22 LAB. L. J. 780, 
781 (1971). 
•• ao m. App. ad 67, aa1 N.E.2d aa5 (1975). 
111 Id. at 69, 331 N.E.2d at 336. 57
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precedent to the dismissal of a nontenured teacher, the court found that 
a board could not delegate or limit the power to dismiss granted to it 
by the legislature. 132 Significantly, the court concluded not only that the 
arbitration of just cause provisions was prohibited, but that arbitration 
of violation of evaluation procedures was prohibited. Emphasizing that 
the legislature had at no time seen fit to impose upon the public schools 
a duty to evaluate and train probationary teachers, the court accord-
ingly concluded that arbitration of such procedures could not be harmo-
nized with the duty and responsibilities of a school board. 133 
Representative of the third approach to the relationship between 
grievance arbitration and the non-delegability of tenure decisions is the 
New York Court of Appeals decision in Cohoes City School District v. 
Cohoes Teachers Association. 134 In Cohoes the arbitrator had awarded 
reinstatement of the teacher which would have automatically ripened 
into tenure, 135 on the grounds that the school board had violated the 
evaluation procedures and the just cause provision in the contract. 136 In 
response to the school district's action to vacate the award the trial court 
confirmed the award. Subsequently, however, the award was modified 
to require the reinstatement of the teacher but without tenure. 137 The 
New York Court of Appeals affirmed on somewhat broader grounds and 
held that the just cause provision was unenforceable to the extent that 
it limited the school board's discretion with respect to its ultimate and 
nondelegable responsibility to make tenure decisions.l36 However, the 
Court held in addition that, because the right to bargained-for sup-
plemental evaluation procedures is not rendered a nullity due to the 
board's right to deny tenure without explanation, temporary reinstate-
ment for the purpose of re-evaluation is a proper remedy .139 In reasoning 
that the responsibility and authority to select and screen teaching per-
sonnel must be exercised by the board and cannot be delegated, 140 the 
Court noted that while the New York Education Laws do not explicitly 
132 Id. at 76-77, 331 N.E.2d at 341. 
133 Id. It is interesting to note the Illinois court's view of teacher evaluation procedures 
designed to benefit the teacher. By way of dicta the Illinois court has indicated that the 
purpose of the school system is not to evaluate, train, supervise, or guide teachers. Id. 
Thus the Illinois court would not appear to view such teacher evaluation procedures as in 
the public interest. Id. at 77, 331 N.E.2d at 341-42. Cf. West Bridgewater, 1977 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 434, 437, 360 N .E.2d 888 (indicating that teacher evaluation procedures may serve the 
public interest). _ 
I:U 40 N.Y.2d 774, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 358 N.E.2d 878 (1976). 
135 Id. at 776, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 54, 358 N.E.2d at 879. 
131 Id. 
137 Id. 
131 Id. at 776-77, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 55, 358 N.E.2d at 880. 
130 Id. at 778, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 56, 358 N.E.2d at 881. 
"" Id. at 777, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 55, 358 N.E.2d at 880. 
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forbid bargaining with respect to the ultimate tenure decision, such a 
prohibition on the scope of arbitration is implicit in public policy. 141 
B. THE Trilogy: THE MASSACHUSE'M'S APPROACH 
1. Scope of Arbitration in Tenure-Related Grievances 
Against the background of recent Massachusetts cases142 standing for 
the proposition that the scope of arbitration is limited by the nondelega-
bility of certain school committee decisions and against the background 
of other jurisdictions taking various approaches to the relationship be-
tween arbitration statutes and tenure statutes, 143 the Court in Danvers 
sought to accomodate section 8 of chapter 150E144 with section 41 of 
chapter 71,146 In particular, premising that tenure decisions under sec-
tion 41 may not be delegated to an arbitrator, the Court sought to 
determine whether the procedures to be followed in evaluating teachers 
for tenure purposes may nevertheless be arbitrated. In concluding that 
such procedures may be arbitrated, the Court struck an accomodation 
between chapter 150E and chapter 71 which rested on two touchstones. 
The first touchstone was the Court's refusal to infer from legislative 
authorization to bargain an intent to permit the school committee to 
bargain away its traditional authority to make tenure decisions. 141 The 
second was the Court's recognition of a legislative policy favoring griev-
ance arbitration.147 Such recognition led the Court to construe narrowly 
the inroads which the nondelegation doctrine may make on the arbitra-
bility of tenure-related grievances. 
It is submitted that the accomodation struck by the Court represents 
a sound solution for several reasons. First, the Court appropriately 
exercised judicial restraint by not inferring from the legislative author-
141 Id. at 778, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 55-56, 358 N.E.2d at 880-81. 
1•z See text at notes 91-114 supra. 
143 See text at notes 115-140 supra. 
144 G.L. c. 150E, § 8. 
141 G.L. c. 71, § 41. 
141 See text at note 19 supra. It is submitted that the Trilogy holdings are significant 
and should also be analyzed as decisions limiting the scope of bargaining in public educa-
tion. While that analysis is not within the scope of this article, practitioners representing 
teachers' associations should be alert to the fact that agreements reached with the school 
committee which touch matters of educational policy may be voidable. The lack of 
enforceability of these agreements further brings into question whether the traditional 
classifications of subjects of bargaining as mandatory, permiuive, or illegal is appropriate 
in the public sector. In particular, the Trilogy suggests that at least so far as public 
education bargaining is concerned some topics may be both permiuive and illegal. See 
Sachman, Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B.C. L. Rev. 155 
(1977). 
147 See text at note 20 supra. 59
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ization to bargain and to arbitrate a sweeping intent to override the 
discretion of the school committee to make tenure decisions. Second, 
the Court's restraint in not inferring a legislative intent to override the 
nondelegation principle, consistent with recent decisions in Hanover14K 
and Braintree149 and the approach to other statutes delegating author-
ity, is particularly justified in light of the policies implicated by the 
tenure statute. 150 Third, in a practical sense, the Court's decision that 
grievances concerning evaluation procedures may be arbitrated will 
tend to encourage more rational decision making while at the same time 
not vitiating the traditional and final authority of school committees. 
The Court's refusal in Danvers to infer generally from chapter 150E 
and more particularly section 8, authorizing voluntary arbitration, an 
intent to override the school committee's discretion in making tenure 
decisions is well founded. To have inferred such an intent would have 
required the Court to legislate the Commonwealth's policy in an area 
which is fraught with many political questions that the judiciary is ill-
equipped to decide. 151 Moreover, section 7 of chapter 150E, 152 specifying 
instances in which the collective bargaining agreement shall prevail over 
prior statutory schemes, 153 appears to negate any inference of legislative 
intent to preempt the education laws by rendering school committee 
decisions delegable. The Court's refusal to infer such a legislative intent 
is further supported by a long line of case law holding that statutes 
affecting the education laws will be strictly construed and that whenever 
the legislature has limited the powers of the school committee it has 
done so explicitly ,154 
Nonadherence to delegation principles would have been inconsistent, 
however, not only with the Court's traditional interpretation of the edu-
cation laws as committing broad discretion to school committees and 
with the structure of chapter 150E, but nonadherence to those principles 
would have been inconsistent as well with the Court's recent holdings 
in Hanover155 and Braintree.l51 Those cases, while narrowly concerned 
118 See text at notes 95-106 supra. 
'" See text at notes 107-14 supra. 
110 See text at notes 156-58 infra. 
"' Both the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court have recognized the principle that a court acts appropriately when it exercises 
judicial restraint in resolving issues best left to the political process or 1mother branch of 
government. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 
525, 531-32, 95 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1950); Schaeffer v. Leimberg, 318 Mass. 396, 400, 62 
N.E.2d 193, 195 (1945). 
"' G.L. c. 150E, § 7. 
'" See note 17 supra, setting out the language of§ 7. 
••• See generally notes at 83-88 supra. 
••• See text at notes 95-105 supra. 
151 See text at notes 107-114 supra. 
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with school cqmmittee decisions abolishing supervisory positions, ap-
peared to imply the nondelegability of other personnel decisions such as 
decisions to grant or withhold tenure. Furthermore, it appears that there 
may have been even stronger public policy reasons for upholding nonde-
legation principles in the Trilogy than were present in Hanover and 
Braintree. Particularly, a tenure decision may have a broader impact on 
questions of long range educational policy than would the reversible and 
potentially short-term decision to eliminate a particular supervisory 
position. By granting tenure the school committee may commit itself to 
curriculum decisions which shape the educational policy of the com-
munity for many years to come. Tenure decisions, therefore, may im-
pact not only on educational policy but ultimately on the allocation of 
resources and the level of services to be provided-an issue better re-
served for the political process.157 Given the potential long range effects 
of tenure decisions, the courts might understandably be disinclined 
to allow school committees, which are politically accountable to their 
communities, to delegate tenure decisions to third parties such as arbi-
trators, who are not politically accountable. Thus, the Trilogy's deter-
mination that tenure decisions are nondelegable would seem even more 
compelling than the holdings of Hanover and Braintree that decisions 
to abolish supervisory positions are nondelegable. 
Just as strong considerations of policy and precedent support the 
Trilogy's premise that tenure decisions remain nondelegable notwith-
standing public sector arbitration, so do compelling reasons support the 
Court's holding that grievances concerning evaluation procedures may 
be arbitrated. First, that holding appears consistent with the Court's 
premise as to the nondelegability of tenure decisions. In particular, 
rather than eviscerating the nondelegation principle, the Court refined 
its approach to that principle and its sources in the education laws. In 
refming that approach the Court properly recognized that, while the 
nondelegability of the actual tenure decision had traditionally been 
upheld, the question of delegability of evaluation procedures was one of 
first impression occasioned by the passage of the arbitration statute. 158 
Thus, the Court correctly concluded that nothing in the traditional 
nondelegability principle precluded the arbitration of grievances con-
cerning evaluation prQcedures. 
In addition to recognizing that evaluation procedures posed an issue 
of first impression, the Court noted that the tenure statute itself mili-
tates against any con~ntion that school committees are to have unbri-
111 See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 
1156, 1177-1183 (1974). 
111 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 418-19, 360 N.E.2d 877, 879. For discussion see also text 
at note 15 supra. 
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dled discretion in the tenure area. 159 Thus, for example, section 41 pro-
vides that failure of the school committee to send timely notice will 
result in the automatic granting of tenure. 180 Accordingly, the Court 
correctly concluded that holding the tenure process nondelegable in all 
its aspects was not only not required by prior precedent, but also would 
be inconsistent with the tenure statute itself. 
In addition to its consistency with the Court's upholding of the nonde-
legability principle, the holding that evaluation procedure-related griev-
ances may be arbitrated will, in a practical sense, tend to encourage 
more rational decision making on the part of school committees. The 
Court in West Bridgewater recognized this foreseeable benefit and 
stated: "Proper teacher evaluation processes, therefore, reasonably may 
be expected to improve the quality of teaching, to mitigate the harsh 
abruptness of an unexplained, last-minute negative renewal decision, 
and to enhance the quality of decisions concerning employment and 
tenure." 181 Therefore, the Court properly concluded that delegation 
under these circumstances would promote the public policies implicit 
in the education laws. 
Having determined that grievances relating to evaluation procedures 
may be arbitrated while the tenure decision itself may not, the Court 
in Danvers impliedly limited the arbitral remedies available where con-
tractual evaluation procedures have been violated. In particular, the 
Danvers Court hinted that deference to the nondelegability of tenure 
decisions required that, where an arbitrator determines that evaluation 
procedures had been violated, the remedies he could award may not 
amount to a grant of tenure. 182 Subsequently, in West Bridgewater the 
Court considered explicitly the extent to which non-delegation princi-
ples may limit arbitral awards. 
2. The Scope of Arbitral Remedies 
Against the backdrop of the Danvers holding that nondelegatility 
limits the extent of arbitrability, the Court in West Bridgewater exam-
ined whether back pay and temporary reinstatement are permissible 
arbitral remedies. Concluding that such remedies are permissible, the 
Court established that nondelegation principles restrict the allowability 
of arbitral remedies by requiring that such remedies may not amount 
to a grant of tenure. 
••• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415,423,360 N.E.2d 877, 881 (indicating that the tenure statute 
has the effect of reducing the traditional wide discretion of school committees) citing 
.Bonar v. Boston, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 240, 244-45, 248, 341 N.E.2d 684, 687-88. 
''" G.L. c. 71, § 41. 
111 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 438, 360 N.E.2d at 888. 
112 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 415, 425, 360 N.E.2d 877, 881. 
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Turning first to the Court's holding that compensation is a permissi-
ble remedy, it is submitted that this holding is consistent with the 
public policy considerations implicit in the Court's decision regarding 
the scope of arbitration. A remedy of compensation would not infringe 
upon the school committee's discretion in determining whether teachers 
will teach in the public schools. Furthermore, the permissibility of a 
compensation remedy is consistent with the Court's earlier holdings in 
Hanover and Braintree. 113 In Braintree the Court upheld an arbitrator's 
award of compensation where the arbitrator had interpreted the collec-
tive bargaining agreement as providing that an employee be made whole 
where his position is unilaterally abolished. 114 
Although the Court in West Bridgewater determined that the com-
mittee's reinstatement of the teacher had effectively mooted the issue 
of reinstatement as an appropriate arbitral remedy, 185 the Court never-
theless properly saw fit to express its views on temporary reinstatement 
as a remedy. The Court thereby provided arbitrators, teachers and 
school committees guidance which may result in the avoidance of un-
necessary challenges to arbitral awards in the future. It is important to 
note, in light of the Court's earlier holding in Danvers, that a permissi-
ble reinstatement remedy cannot amount to the granting of tenure. 188 
Thus, the temporary reinstatement remedy approved by the Court 
would not result in tenure under section 41 of chapter 71 of the General 
Laws.t•7 
The Court's determination that temporary reinstatement is an appro-
priate remedy where the school committee has failed to adhere to the 
contractual evaluation procedures is also consistent with the Court's 
narrow interpretation of nondelegation which underlies the Danvers 
holding. Moreover, the remedy of reinstatement to re-evaluate the 
teacher furthers certain public policy interests outlined by the Court in 
West Bridgewater. 118 
While the Court's approval of temporary reinstatement as a permissi-
ble arbitral remedy represents sound policy, reinstatement as a remedy 
nevertheless presents several practical problems. With the exception of 
clearing the teacher's record by indicating in the teacher's file that the 
111 See text at notes 95-114 supra for discuBBion of the Court's holding. 
1u See note 114 supra. 
111 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 438, 360 N.E.2d at 888. 
111 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 425, 360 N.E.2d at 881. 
117 G.L. c. 71, § 41. 
111 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 437, 360 N.E.2d at 888. The Court listed the following 
circumstances to indicate how teacher evaluation procedures may serve the public inter-
est: by (1) aBBisting the teacher to improve performance in order to avoid an adverse 
decision, (2) providing advanced warning to the teacher that he or she should seek alter-
native employment, and (3) permitting the teacher to complete or correct information 
which the school committee will consider in its renewal decision. ld. 
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decision not to renew was the result of a failure on the part of the school 
committee to follow evaluation procedures, reinstatement will often be 
an ineffective remedy because of the time constraints inherent in the 
grievance and arbitral process. In particular, in order for reinstatement 
to be a meaningful remedy the grievance would have to go to arbitration 
sufficiently early, in most cases before the school year has ended, so that 
the teacher could be reinstated for the following school year. By the time 
the parties exhaust a four-step grievance procedure, following notifica-
tion of nonrenewal in April, 181 the aggrieved teacher will have been 
forced to seek other employment. In most cases, unless the school com-
mittee is willing to let the grievant continue teaching, pending the out-
come of arbitration, the temporary reinstatement will have little effect 
other than to clear the teacher's record. However, the temporary rein-
statement could be made a more effective remedy if more expeditious 
grievance procedures are adopted.170 
Assuming that the above practical problems militating against rein-
statement can be overcome, either by more expeditious grievance proce-
dures or voluntary reinstatement pending arbitration, West Bridgewater 
may imply the availability to teachers of a broad range of supplemental 
arbitral remedies. Thus, as long as the school committee retains the 
final decision on tenure, 171 the grievant or the association might seek, for 
example, in-service training or transfer as part of the arbitral remedy. 
This would appear to be an appropriate remedy where one of the pur-
poses of the evaluation procedures is to aid the teacher in improving his 
or her performance. In West Bridgewater, the Court, by way of dicta, 
recognized such a purpose as acceptable and in fact consistent with the 
public interest. 172 Thus, where the purpose of evaluation procedures is 
to benefit the teacher, there may be instances in which, where the cir-
cumstances call for it, the temporary reinstatement remedy might be 
accompanied by a directive to transfer the teacher or to provide the 
teacher with in-service training. 
111 Under G.L. c. 71, § 41 the school committee is required to notify the teacher of its 
nonrenewal decision by April 15. 
171 The practical problems thus inherent in an arbitral remedy of temporary reinstate-
ment may suggest that the teachers' association may wish to challenge defects in evalua-
tion procedures as they occur rather than waiting until the school committee has made a 
negative decision based upon such evaluations. 
171 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 425, 360 N.E.2d at 881. See, Smith, Edwards and Clark, 
Labor Relations in the Public Sector (1974), at 945 n.3, indicating that courts are likely 
to be more active in reviewing the merits of public sector arbitration awards involving (1) 
constitutional questions; (2) conflicting statutory regulations; (3) important questions of 
"public policy"; (4) tenure questions in public education; (5) public fiscal and budgetary 
matters. See also 1977 Cumulative Supplement at 133-137 for more recent cases review-
ing arbitrators' awards in the public sector. 
172 See note 168 supra. 
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Finally, the Trilogy was concerned only with remedies which the arbi-
trator can award the teacher, and thus left open the question of remedies 
which the arbitrator can award the union when evaluation procedures 
are not complied with.173 1t is submitted that a denial of proper evalua-
tion procedures may be of equal significance to the union as to the 
individual teacher, for where improper evaluation occurs, teachers as a 
group have been denied a bargained-for-benefit. Therefore, where viola-
tions are substantial, the union may wish to seek a reopener in order to 
renegotiate other items or wages traded off in exchange for the arbitra-
tion clause.174 
m. LIMITS ON ARBITRATION BEYOND THosE REQUIRED BY NoNDELEGATION 
PRINCIPLES: QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE Trilogy 
The accomodation reached by the Trilogy is sound so far as the extent 
of issues resolved, but the Court left open several questions which will 
continue to concern teachers seeking arbitration of grievances. These 
questions go beyond the nondelegation doctrine and cannot be answered 
by the Trilogy accomodation. The first question raised is whether the 
Court will uphold grievance arbitration or an arbitrator's award for 
violation of evaluation procedures where the record indicates that the 
teacher would not have been granted tenure in any event. Second, even 
if causation can be demonstrated, the Trilogy implies that an arbitral 
award may be vacated because it violates some "fundamental princi-
ple;' implicit in the education laws. 
The first unanswered question, that of the permissibility of arbitral 
relief where causation is disputed, is bound to present problems for 
teachers, school committees and arbitrators. Although not necessary to 
171 See generally 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 438-42, 360 N.E.2d 888-90. The Court fails to 
consider remedies available to the union when bargained-for evaluation procedures are 
violated. 
17
• See School Committee of Boston v. Boston Teachers Union, 1977 Mau. Adv. Sh. 
1069, 1077, 363 N.E.2d 485, 489 stating: 
In a large sense, it seems evident that if voluntary interest arbitration is to make 
an appeal to the parties and carry out its purpose of avoiding strife, it must, 
optimally, imitate the range of negotiations which it supercedes. The interplay and 
"tradeoff'' of mandatory and other items which are described as "the very fabric 
of effective collective bargaining," Oil Workers Int'l Local3-89 v. NLRB, 132 U.S. 
App. D.C. 43, 405 F.2d 111, 117 (1968), have their place in voluntary arbitration of 
the terms of a labor contract and will tend to improve and make more livable the 
arbitral results. 
In the Trilogy, the argument for a reopener is suggested by the fact that the right to 
arbitrate may be illusory where teacher evaluation procedures are concerned. While the 
arbitrator may require procedures to be followed as a remedy, the school committee still 
makes the final determination on tenure. 
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its holding in Danvers, the Court raised and left open the validity of an 
arbitration award which imposes sanctions on a school committee for 
failure to follow evaluation procedures even though no teacher was 
harmed by the omission. 175 The issue, although unresolved by the 
Trilogy, is of importance to both the school committee and the union. 
For undoubtedly, in the case of a teacher who clearly would not have 
been rehired in spite of flaws in evaluation, the school committee will 
want to challenge an award of reinstatement on the grounds that such 
a sanction is too harsh and violates public policy. 
While an arbitrator is not bound by the Court's caveat, it is submitted 
that there are sound policies why the arbitrator should carefully exam-
ine causation to determine his award. Clearly an undeserving teacher 
should not be able to take advantage of technical error on the part of 
the school committee in violation of the public policies favoring teacher 
evaluation procedures. 
Even if the union can show causation, an arbitral award may still be 
subject to challenge to vacate by the caveat of West Bridgewater. 171 The 
principle that an arbitration award may be vacated if it violates some 
fundamental principle concerning the management of a school and the 
committee's right to choose its teachers177 appears intended to apply to 
the egregious situation of teacher misbehavior or incompetence. Thus, 
the caveat places no new restrictions on arbitration remedies beyond the 
established principles that an arbitrator may not award a remedy in 
violation of public policy as by ordering the commission of an unlawful 
act. 178 For example, an arbitration award ordering reinstatement of a 
teacher where the presence of the teacher would constitute a serious 
threat to the health or safety of students would constitute an illegal 
award and therefore would be vacated under common law principles 
governing arbitration awards. As a practical matter school committees 
may attempt to invoke this limitation on arbitral remedies by seeking 
to vacate reinstatement awards where the alleged incompetency of the 
teacher threatens to harm student learning. Such an allegation must be 
carefully weighed by a court in order that the principles implicit in the 
Trilogy accommodation are not abrogated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trilogy clarified the extent to which the Court will apply nondele-
gation principles to limit the scope of arbitration in teacher tenure dis-
171 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 426, 360 N.E.2d at 882. 
171 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 441-42, 360 N.E.2d at 890. 
177 Id. 
178 F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 38 (3d ed. 1973). 
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putes. In accomodating the right to bargain and authorization to arbi-
trate with the nondelegable duty of school committees to make tenure 
decisions the Court has defined the scope of arbitration to exclude the 
tenure decision itself while at the same time upholding the arbitrability 
of contractual teacher evaluation procedures. In so doing the Court has 
thus indicated to school committees, teachers, and arbitrators the 
Commonwealth's policy regarding the arbitrability of public education 
disputes. Furthermore, the Trilogy, while leaving some questions unre-
solved, provides guidance to arbitrators concerning the permissibility of 
compensation and reinstatement remedies. The decision is of particular 
significance to school committees in that it warns school committees 
that if they wish to extend grievance arbitration to grievances concern-
ing teacher evaluation procedures they must explicitly provide so in the 
agreement. Of significance to teachers' associations is the fact that 
despite agreements to arbitrate and other negotiated procedural pro-
tections in the form of evaluation procedures, the tenure decision itself 
cannot be subject to arbitration. 
Jo ELLEN OJEDA 
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